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JEROLD H. ISRAEL
ELFBRANDT V. RUSSELL: THE
DEMISE OF THE OATH?
In Elfbrandt v. Russell,' the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 decision,
declared unconstitutional Arizona's requirement of a loyalty oath
from state employees. At first glance, Elfbrandt appears to be just
another decision voiding a state loyalty oath on limited grounds
relating to the specific language of the particular oath.2 Yet, several
aspects of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the majority suggest
that Elfbrandt is really of far greater significance: 3 it may sharply
Jerold H. Israel is Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1384 U.S. 11 (1966).
2 Immediate reaction generally placed the case in this category. The New York
Thnes, for example, made the following comments in describing Elfbrandt: "The
decision avoided sweeping terms that might also have invalidated loyalty oaths of
other states. But it continued the high court's recent tendency to resolve all consti-
tutional doubts against loyalty oath laws....
"In the early nineteen-fifties the Supreme Court upheld loyalty oaths relating to
Los Angeles city employees, teachers in New York State, and candidates for public
office in Maryland. But in recent years without overruling the principle that public
employees can be required to sign such oaths, it has struck down several, finding
that they were improperly drafted." N.Y. Times, April 19, 1966, p. 1, col. 6; p. 1,
col. 4. See also Chicago Tribune, April 19, 1966, p. 3, cols. 1-3; NEWSWEEK 21 (May
2, 1966).
3 Even if the Elfbrandt ruling were limited to the particular language of the
Arizona statute, it would still have a significant impact on the laws of several states
since the Arizona provision is based on Maryland's widely copied "Ober Act" See
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 85a, §§ 1, 10, 11 (1965 Supp.); FLA. REv. STAT., tit. 44, ch. 876,
§§ 22, 24, 25 (1965 Supp.); Miss. CODE ANN., tit. 17, ch. 10, §§ 4064-01,4064-02,4064-
03 (1964 Supp.); N.H. RFv. STAT. ANN., ch. 588, §§ 1, 9 (1965 Supp.); OxLA. STAT.
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limit the scope and coverage of loyalty oaths generally and, in-
deed, may presage a ruling invalidating all such oaths. Of course,
only the Supreme Court can determine this. In the meantime, some
evaluation by others seems appropriate, particularly in light of
the numerous attacks against loyalty oaths currently being mounted
in various state courts and legislatures. 4
I. THE ELFBRANDT OPINIONS
A. THE BACKGROUND
In form, if not in substance, the Arizona loyalty oath considered
in Elfbrandt was unusual. For its language contained none of the
negative disclaimers of affiliation or advocacy that mark the test
oath.5 The employee merely swore to "support and defend the
constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic"; that he would "bear true faith and allegiance to the
same"; and that he would "well and faithfully discharge the duties
of [his] office."" An oath in this form had been required of Ari-
zona's public employees since 1901.1 In 1961, however, the legisla-
ture, in adopting Arizona's version of the Communist Control Act,"
put a gloss on the 1901 oath that, in effect, turned it into a more
typical loyalty oath. Section 5 of the Arizona Communist Control
Act made it a crime "subject to all the penalties for perjury" for
any employee, having taken the positive oath of allegiance, there-
after "knowingly and willfully" (1) to "commit or aid in the
commission of any act to overthrow [the state government] by
force or violence," (2) to advocate the overthrow of the state
government by such means, or (3) to "become or remain a mem-
ber of the Communist party, its subordinate organizations, or any
AN., tit. 21, ch. 52, §§ 1266.4, 1266.6 (1965 Supp.); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 65, ch. 11,
§§ 212, 213, 214 (1965 Supp.); see also IND. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, ch. 52, §§ 10-5203,
10-5207 (1965 Supp.).
4 See ACLU, Feature Press Service Bulletin, § 2266, May 16, 1966.
5 See BROWN, LOYALTY AND SEctnurY 92-95 (1958); Koenigsberg & Stavis, Test
Oaths: Henry VIII to the American Bar Association, 11 LAW. GuIu, Rzv. 111 (1951).
See generally HI-ymA, To TRY MEN's SouLs (1960).
6Amiz. STAT. § 38-231 (1965 Supp.).
7 ARiz. Riv. STAT. § 222 (1901). The oath was originally adopted while Arizona
was still a territory, and consequently was amended in several respects when Ari-
zona was admitted to statehood.
8 Ariz. Laws 1961, c. 108, § 1-9.
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other organization having for one of its purposes the overthrow
by force or violence of the [state] government" where the employee
"had kmowledge of said unlawful purpose of said organization or
organizations."0 To supplement § 5, the Arizona act also required
all government employees to resubscribe to the oath of allegiance
as interpreted in the light of the new section.10
Petitioner Elfbrandt, a teacher in the Tucson public schools,
refused to take the oath and brought suit in the Arizona state courts
to have the state oath requirement declared unconstitutional."
That litigation lasted five years and was twice taken to the United
States Supreme Court before the Arizona statute was finally held
unconstitutional.'
2
0 That section amended § 38-231 to read as follows: 'E. Any officer or employee
as defined in this section having taken the form of oath or affirmation prescribed by
this section, and knowingly or wilfully at the time of subscribing the oath or
affirmation, or at any time thereafter during his term of office or employment, does
commit or aid in the commission of any act to overthrow by force or violence the
government of this state or of any of its political subdivisions, or advocates the
overthrow by force or violence of the government of this state or of any of its
political subdivisions, or during such term of office or employment knowingly and
wilfully becomes or remains a member of the communist party of the United
States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations or any other organiza-
tion having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the gov-
ernment of the state of Arizona or any of its political subdivisions, and said officer
or employee as defined in this section prior to becoming or remaining a member of
such organization or organizations had knowledge of said unlawful purpose of
said organization or organizations, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction
thereof shall be subject to all the penalties for perjury; in addition, upon convic-
tion under this section, the officer or employee shall be deemed discharged from
said office or employment and shall not be entitled to any additional compensation
or any other emoluments or benefits which may have been incident or appurtenant
to said office or employment."
All references to § 5 in the text of this article refer to this provision, now Aiuz.
REv. STAT. § 38-231E (1965 Supp.).
10 Aiuz. REV. STAT. § 8-231(c) (1965 Supp.).
11 Although the Arizona act requires all employees to take the oath, the only
sanction provided for failure to do so is denial of compensation. Consequently,
the petitioner retained her job and simply continued to teach without pay. This
aspect of the case attracted at least as much attention from the press as did the
Court's opinion. See, e.g., NEwswEEr, supra note 2. The back pay accumulated by
petitioner and her husband, a fellow teacher who also refused to take the oath,
amounted to over $60,000, but apparently the school boards involved were not
entirely sure of the Elfbrandts' right to the money even after the Supreme Court
decision. Ann Arbor News, June 23, 1966, p. 7, cols. 2-5.
12 The Arizona Supreme Court later found in an opinion as yet unreported that
the petitioner still was required to take the oath, although the special gloss of
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On the first appeal to the Supreme Court, an Arizona Supreme
Court decision upholding the oath was vacated, 13 and the case was
remanded for reconsideration in the light of Baggett v. Bullitt.
14
In Baggett the Supreme Court had found unconstitutionally vague
a Washington oath that contained language very much like that
found in the first clause of § 5.15 On remand, however, a majority
of the Arizona court found that Baggett was inapplicable since the
reference in § 5 to activity aiding an act designed to overthrow the
government had a much narrower and more traditional scope than
did a similar reference in the Washington oath.' One member
of the Arizona court, Justice Bernstein, dissented on the ground
that Baggett was controlling. 17 The dissent was not based on the
first clause of § 5, however, but was tied entirely to the third
clause of that section, which prohibits an employee from knowingly
becoming a member of any organization "having for one of its
purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the government."'"
Justice Bernstein found that this clause failed adequately to identify
the nature of the organization in which membership was barred,
and, therefore, that it was unconstitutionally vague. As an illustra-
tion, he pointed to the university scientist, who, he said, "could
not know whether membership is prohibited in an international
scientific organization which includes members from neutralist
nations and Communist bloc nations-the latter admittedly dedicated
to the overthrow of our government and which control the organi-
zation.... Though all might agree that the principal purpose of
such organization is scientific, the statute makes [the scientist's]
membership a crime if any subordinate purpose is the overthrow
§ 38-231E was no longer applicable. See Ann Arbor News, June 23, 1966, p. 7, cols.
2-5.
13378 U.S. 127 (1964), vacating 94 Ariz. 1 (1963).
14 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
15 Washington required public employees to swear that they were not sub-
versive persons as defined by statute: "'Subversive person' means any person who
commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advocates, abets,
advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt to commit, or aid
in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter, or to assist
in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of the constitutional form of the gov-
ernment of the United States, or of the state of Washington or any political sub-
division of either of them by revolution, force, or violence... ." Wash. Laws 1955,
c. 377.
16 97 Ariz. 140 (1965). 3.7 Id. at 147. 18 See note 9 supra.
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of the state government." "The vice of vagueness here," he con-
cluded, "is that the scientist cannot know whether membership
in the organization would result in a prosecution for violation of
[§ 5] or in honors from his university for the encyclopedic knowl-
edge acquired... in part through his membership."'19
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION
On review of the Arizona decision, Mr. Justice Douglas, speak-
ing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Black, Brennan, and
Fortas, agreed with Justice Bernstein that the invalidity of the
third or so-called membership clause of § 5 rendered Arizona's
oath requirement unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion,
however, the majority opinion, though quoting extensively from
Justice Bernstein's dissent, did not rely upon the "void for vague-
ness" rationale that he had used.20 Rather, Mr. Justice Douglas'
opinion was based squarely on the ground that the membership
clause of § 5 violated a basic principle restricting the scope of
statutes affecting First Amendment rights. Quoting from Cantwell
v. Connecticut and Shelton v. Tucker, Mr. Justice Douglas de-
scribed that principle as follows:2
"[A] statute touching... protected rights must be narrowly
drawn to define and punish specific conduct as constituting a
clear and present danger to a substantial interest of the state."
... Legitimate legislative goals "cannot be pursued by means
that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved."
Mr. Justice Douglas found that the Arizona statute failed to meet
this standard because it applied to employees who might knowingly
join organizations favoring violent overthrow of the government
but who themselves might not subscribe to that goal. In including
such persons, § 5 necessarily relied, said Mr. Justice Douglas, on
an improper theory of "guilt by association" and the section there-
fore had "infringe[d] unnecessarily" on protected First Amend-
ment rights.
22
The crux of the reasoning that led Mr. Justice Douglas to this
19 97 Ariz. at 147-48. 20 384 US. at 14-15.
21Id. at 18, quoting from Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940), and
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488 (1960).
22 384 U.S. at 19.
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conclusion is found in several paragraphs toward the end of his
opinion. 8 First, he noted that in Scales v. United States2 4 the Court
had recognized that "'a blanket prohibition of association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims' would pose 'a real danger
that legitimate political expression or association would be im-
paired.' " Accordingly, the Court in Scales had carefully limited
the application of the membership clause of the Smith Act to those
members of organizations advocating overthrow who were both
"active" in their membership and had the "specific intent of as-
sisting in achieving the unlawful ends of the organization." 2 The
constitutional significance of the "specific intent" requirement im-
posed by Scales had been clearly established in Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State27 when the Court voided a statute prohibiting the
issuance of passports to members of "Communist organizations"
precisely because that statute "covered membership which was not
accompanied by a specific intent to further the unawful aims of
the organization.1 28 The Arizona "oath and accompanying statu-
tory gloss suffer from an identical constitutional infirmity" as
the statute in Aptheker2 9 Under § 5 a state employee who know-
ingly joins an organization "which has as 'one of its purposes' the
violent overthrow of the government is subject to immediate dis-
charge and criminal penalties" even though he "does not subscribe
to the organization's unlawful ends."' 0 As a result, here, as in Bag-
gett v. Bullitt, persons risk prosecution by engaging in "knowing
but guiltless" activity. Illustrative might be the teacher who at-
tends the Pugwash Conference or "joins a seminar group predomi-
nantly Communist and therefore subject to control by those who
are said to believe in the overthrow of the government."31 Sure-
ly, Mr. Justice Douglas continued:3 2 "Those who join an organi-
zation but do not share its unlawful purposes and who do not
participate in its unlawful activities pose no threat, either as citi-
zens or public employees." A law which encompasses such per-
sons "impose[s], in effect, a conclusive presumption that the mem-
ber shares the unlawful aims of the organizations," and for that
reason alone is clearly unconstitutional.33 Summarizing the Court's
position at the conclusion of the opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas
wrote: 
3 4
23Id. at 15-18. 27 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 31 Id. at 17.
24 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 28 384 U.S. at 16. 32 Ibid.
25 384 U.S. at 15. 29 Ibid. 33 Ibid.
26 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 34 Id. at 19.
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A law which applies to membership without "the specific in-
tent" to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes
unnecessarily on protected freedoms. It rests on the doctrine of
"guilt by association" which has no place here.... Such a law
cannot stand.
C. THE DISSENTING OPINION
Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clark,
Harlan, and Stewart, noted at the outset that "[a]ccording to un-
equivocal prior holdings of this Court, a state is entitled to con-
dition public employment upon its employees abstaining from
knowing membership in... organizations advocating the violent
overthrow of the government which employs them," and "the
state is [also] constitutionally authorized to inquire into such af-
filiations and . . . discharge those who refuse to affirm or deny
them."35 The dissent cited eight previous decisions in support of
this proposition, and noted that Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion "does
not mention or purport to overrule these cases." 38 Neither does
the majority opinion, as Mr. Justice White read it, "expressly hold"
that a state "must retain" as employees those who knowingly hold
membership in organizations aiming at violent overthrow. "It
would seem, therefore," he concluded, "that the Court's judgment
is only aimed at the criminal provisions of the Arizona law which
exposes an employee to a perjury prosecution if he swears falsely
about membership when he signs the oath or if he later becomes
a knowing member while remaining in public employment."
37
Mr. Justice White then argued that the distinction the Court
appears to have drawn between criminal and civil sanctions is
invalid. The right to punish for intentional falsification is clear
from prior cases. As for the punishment of employees who later
join an organization of the proscribed type:38 "If a State may dis-
qualify for knowing membership . . . , it is likewise within its
35 Ibid.
36 Id. at 20. Six cases were cited directly: Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341
U.S. 56 (1951); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Adler v.
Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S.
399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 US. 1 (1960). The dissent cited as "see also" two other cases: Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551
(1956).
37 384 U.S. at 20. 38 Id. at 21.
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powers to move criminally against the employee who knowingly
engages in disqualifying acts during his employment." "The
crime provided by the Arizona law," Mr. Justice White empha-
sized, "is not just the act of becoming a member of an organization
but it is that membership plus concurrent public employment." 30
The dissent also argued that "there is nothing in Scales... or
Aptbeker... dictating the result reached by the Court. '40 Scales
involved the general criminal provisions of the Smith Act and
therefore was not in point. Neither was Aptheker, since the statu-
tory provision involved there applied to members who actually
lacked knowledge of the organization's illicit purpose. In fact,
Speiser v. Randall,41 another case cited by the majority, had "care-
fully preserved" Gerende v. Board of Supervisors4 2 and Garner
v. Board of Public Works,4 s two cases upholding test oaths for
employees that were based on the same principles as the Arizona
oath. Finally, Mr. Justice White suggested that even if one were
to accept the majority's position and were to hold that Arizona
may not take criminal action against employees who are knowing
members of organizations aiming at violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment, the appropriate remedy would not be to invalidate the
Arizona oath requirement as the majority had done, but to remand
the case to the state court to determine the severability of the crimi-
nal provisions of the Arizona statute.
D. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SILENCE
When viewed in light of the dissent, two aspects of Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion immediately stand out. Both deal, not unsur-
prisingly, more with what the opinion left unsaid than with what
it said. The first is the complete absence of any reply to the dissent,
either with respect to its narrow characterization of the majority
ruling or with respect to the cases Mr. Justice White cited as
clearly controlling if the majority had sought to rely on a broader
ground. The second is the absence in both opinions, but particularly
in the majority opinion, of any meaningful discussion of the nature
of the state's interests in the loyalty oath requirement. These
omissions are significant for more than the light they may shed
39 Ibid. 41357 U.S. 513 (1958).
40 Id. at 22. 42 341 U.S. 56 (1951). 43 Id. at 716.
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on the professional quality of the Court's opinion. The inferences
to be drawn from the opinion's silence on these matters probably
will determine what impact Elfbrandt will have upon the permis-
sible scope and coverage of loyalty oaths.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION
Dissenting opinions are hardly the best source for determin-
ing the breadth of a majority ruling. This is particularly true when
a case is decided by a close vote as Elfbrandt was, and when the
dissent is concerned with the next case and the possibility of ac-
complishing a shift in the Court's position not inconsistent with
the immediate decision. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice White's char-
acterization of the Court's ruling as grounded solely on Arizona's
use of criminal sanctions finds just enough support in the majority
opinion that it cannot be dismissed out of hand as simply a dis-
senter's tactic.
First, there is the fact that the majority made no effort to reply to
Mr. Justice White's statement of its ruling. Admittedly Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas' opinion does not place primary emphasis on the
criminal sanctions imposed by § 5, although it does make frequent
mention of these sanctions.44 It is also true, as will be seen later,
that the cases cited by Mr. Justice White as otherwise controlling
are distinguishable on grounds other than Arizona's reliance on
criminal sanctions in § 5.45 Still, since it would have taken so little
flatly to reject Mr. Justice White's interpretation, it is difficult to
understand why this was not done. Perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas,
who had dissented in several of the cases cited by Mr. Justice
White, felt that any attempt to distinguish those cases would give
them undue recognition. Perhaps the majority's failure to reply
to the dissent reflects no more than the often criticized tendency
of members of the present Court to engage "in separate mono-
logues rather than a dialogue." 47 Yet the absence of any reply to
an obvious attempt to limit a majority opinion is unusual, and a
44 See 384 U.S. at 16-17.
45 See text infra, at section III.
46Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in five of the eight cases cited by Mr. Justice
White: Garner, Adler, Beilan, Lerner, and Nelson. See note 36 supra.
47 Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of Politics and
Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WAsu. L. REv. 587, 591 (1963).
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possible inference therefrom is that at least one member of the
majority accepted Mr. Justice White's interpretation of its ruling.
Another element that may be cited in support of Mr. Justice
White's interpretation is the fact that the two cases on which Mr.
Justice Douglas relied most heavily, Scales and Aptheker, both
involved criminal statutes.48 Moreover, insofar as Scales was con-
cerned, it was commonly recognized that the Court there had
employed a standard of review far different from that used in
previous loyalty oath cases, such as Garner and Gerende.49
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice White's interpretation of the majority's
ruling is most difficult to accept because such a decision would
be unsupportable in either precedent or logic. Admittedly, the
Court has generally distinguished statutes imposing criminal sanc-
tions on speech or association, such as the Smith Act, from statutes
imposing more "limited" sanctions, such as disqualification from
employment under a state loyalty program. No matter whether
the standard has been described in terms of balancing, overbroad-
ness, or defining protected speech, the Court has always given
considerably more leeway to a legislature's non-criminal sanc-
tions.10 Thus, in the Hatch Act case, United Public Workers v.
48 Scales involved a criminal prosecution under the Smith Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
Aptbeker involved a suit for a declaratory judgment in which the Court was asked
to declare unconstitutional a criminal provision of the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
49 Although the Court had not actually discussed Scales as it related to the
loyalty oath cases, the First Amendment issues in Scales were resolved largely on
the basis of Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Dennis involved a con-
siderably more restrictive standard of review than the loyalty oath cases. See, e.g.,
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
527-28 (1958).
50 In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), Mr. Justice Harlan described
this distinction-actually based on the function of the restriction on speech-in
terms of the difference between those cases in which the Court determines whether
"the speech . . . [is] outside the scope of constitutional protection" and those in
which the Court applies what is commonly referred to as the "balancing" test. Id.
at 49-51. Unfortunately, the wide-ranging debate over use of "balancing" in First
Amendment cases has tended to obscure the distinction drawn by Mr. Justice Har-
lan. Certainly, all decisions in this area, whether phrased in terms of balancing or
defining the scope of "protected" speech necessarily involve an evaluation of com-
peting interests. See Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 30 GEo. WAsH. L.
Rav. 167 (1961); Karst, Legislative Fact in Constitutional Litigation, [1960] SvuanzPr
Couar REviaw 75, 95. It is also true that the Court may sometimes speak in terms of
balancing even in dealing with restrictions upon borderline classes of speech. See,
[1966
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Mitchell,)" the Court sustained the power of the federal govern-
ment to discharge employees who engaged in certain political
activities, although a criminal statute inhibiting such action by
the general public clearly would be unconstitutional. 2 The
distinction drawn in Mitchell and similar cases has not, however,
rested on the nature of the sanction employed by the legislature,
but on the purpose of the legislation 3 Criminal sanctions gener-
e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951), dealing with speech advocat-
ing illegal activity. But the type of balancing referred to by Mr. Justice Harlan in
Konigsberg rests upon an entirely different approach, if not a different process,
than that balancing involved without recognition in the obscenity cases and with
recognition in Dennis. See generally Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," [1964] SuPzrME CouRT REvmW
191, 213-17. But see Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YAIE L. J. 1424,
1429-32 (1962).
Unlike Dennis and other cases involving direct restraints, the Court in Elfbrandt
does not proceed from the premise that there is a central core area of clearly pro-
tected speech and the relation of the legislatively proscribed speech to that core
will, in large measure, determine the constitutionality of the proscription. See
Kalven, supra, at 204-11. See also Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d
Cir. 1950). Since the legislative restriction on speech in Mr. Justice Harlan's second
category of cases is an incidental aspect of a general regulation, the nature of the
speech involved obviously becomes less significant, and the basic assumption is that
"compelling" state interest will justify an incidental restriction imposed even on
speech within the central core area. See generally Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960). Accordingly, the Court's approach to "weighing" competing interests
in this class of cases is much more akin to the normal standard of substantive due
process than is the evaluation of the nature of the speech and the legislative interest
in cases of direct restraints on speech, such as Dennis, or New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 US. 254 (1964).
51330 U.S. 75 (1947).
52 Id. at 101-04. The political activity involved in the case before the Court was
participation "as [an] executive committeeman and a worker at the polls." Id. at 103.
53 Although the Court in Mitchell did not attempt to distinguish cases involving
restrictions aimed directly at the content of speech, it did emphasize that the con-
gressional purpose in the Hatch Act was to preserve the efficiency of the federal
service and not to restrict political activities. See 330 U.S. at 101-04. The distinction
between cases like Mitchell and those involving direct restraints on speech was
clearly stated in later cases. In Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961),
the Court described that distinction as follows: "Throughout its history this Court
has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected
freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand
certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, have been considered out-
side the scope of constitutional protection. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568; Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494; Beaubarnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476. On the other hand, general regulatory
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ally have been used in legislation aimed directly at suppressing a
particular class of speech, either because of disagreement with
its content or concern for its impact upon an audience. 4 The
more limited sanctions, such as disqualification from public office
or the denial of permission to use public streets for political rallies,
are usually found in legislation aimed at the prevention of certain
conduct other than that produced by the speech.55 The regulation
of speech in these circumstances imposes what the Court describes
as an "indirect" restriction on speech, an "incidental" by-product
of the prohibition of undesirable conduct.56 Thus, the purpose of
the Hatch Act was not to suppress political activities, but to pre-
vent a situation conducive to the administrative evils of a spoils
system.5 ' Similarly, prohibitions against the employment of per-
sons who advocate the overthrow of the government have tradi-
tionally been looked upon as an "indirect" restriction on speech
because the legislation is aimed not at the content of the speech,
statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its
unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Four-
teenth Amendments forbade Congress or the state to pass, when they have been
found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to
constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental
interest involved. See e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161; Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77; American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382; Breard v. Alex-
andria, 341 U.S. 622." See also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 396, 399 (1950). But cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-60 (1965).
5 45 See, e.g., the first group of cases cited by Mr. Justice Harlan in the excerpt
from Konigsberg quoted in note 53 supra.
55 See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 (1950):
"But the question with which we are here faced is not the same one that Justices
Holmes and Brandeis found convenient to consider in terms of clear and present
danger. Government's interest here is not in preventing the dissemination of Com-
munist doctrine or the holding of particular beliefs because it is feared that unlaw-
ful action will result therefrom if free speech is practiced. Its interest is in protect-
ing the free flow of commerce from what Congress considers to be substantial evils
of conduct that are not the products of speech at all. Section 9(h), in other words,
does not interfere with speech because Congress fears the consequences of speech;
it regulates harmful conduct which Congress has determined is carried on by per-
sons who may be identified by their political affiliations and beliefs:' See also
Speiser v. Randall, quoted infra note 58.
56 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 527 (1958); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396,
399 (1950).
57 330 U.S. at 102-03.
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but at the potential performance of the speaker in public office.
The reference to the speech of a particular content is viewed, in
effect, merely as a means of identifying a person who is more
likely to engage in undesirable conduct as an employee.58
While not all the members of the Court have agreed that
statutes restricting government employment on the basis of speech
or association should be characterized as indirect restraints on
speech, generally they all do recognize that the key to such char-
acterization must be the purpose of the legislation, not the nature
of the sanction used to implement that purpose.P9 The Court has
58 See note 56 supra. See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958): "The
appellees, in controverting this position, rely on cases in which this Court has sus-
tained the validity of loyalty oaths required of public employees, Garner v. Board
of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716; candidates for public office, Gerende v. Board of
Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56, and officers of labor unions, American Communications
Assn. v. Douds, supra. In these cases, however, there was no attempt directly to
control speech but rather to protect, from an evil shown to be grave, some interest
clearly within the sphere of governmental concern. The purpose of the legislation
sustained in the Douds case, the Court found, was to minimize the danger of politi-
cal strikes disruptive of interstate commerce by discouraging labor unions from
electing Communist Party members to union office. While the Court recognized
that the necessary effect of the legislation was to discourage the exercise of rights
protected by the First Amendment, this consequence was said to be only indirect.
The congressional purpose was to achieve an objective other than restraint on
speech. Only the method of achieving this end touched on protected rights and
that only tangentially. The evil at which Congress had attempted to strike in that
case was thought sufficiently grave to justify limited infringement of political
rights. Similar considerations governed the other cases. Each case concerned a
limited class of persons in or aspiring to public positions by virtue of which they
could, if evilly motivated, create serious danger to the public safety. The principal
aim of those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny positions to
persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be misused to the
detriment of the public."
But cf. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456-60 (1965). Brown possibly
could be extended further to undermine this line of analysis. The Court there
suggested that the legislative purpose to prohibit misuses of office could constitute
"punishment" for the purposes of the bill of attainder prohibition. Whether the
Court would then use the clause to invalidate a restriction stated in terms of a
class larger than the membership of a particular organization remains to be seen.
Certainly the opinion in Brown and certain aspects of Elfbrandt indicate it would
not. 381 U.S. at 461-62; see text infra, at note 111-14.
0 Of the present Justices who were then sitting, only Justices Black and Douglas
did not join in the characterization of the loyalty oath cases as indirect restraints
in Konigsberg or Speiser, supra note 56. Both Justices have rejected the applica-
tion of the "balancing" test in these cases, but this stems from their belief that
loyalty oaths are not really aimed at preventing misuse of conduct, but are "direct"
restrictions designed primarily to punish speech. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
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recognized that indirect restraints e.g., a limitation on the use of
sound amplifiers, may be enforced by criminal sanctions. 0 The
Court has also recognized that direct restraints need not always
take the form of criminal prohibitions, as is illustrated by the
restriction on the receipt of mail recently invalidated in Lamont
v. Postmaster,61 and the denial of a veterans' tax exemption voided
in Speiser v. Randall."2 To be sure, the purpose of the legislation
has not always been clearly identified as the important factor in
distinguishing between direct and indirect restraints.6 3 As a result,
there has been occasional confusion in the lower courts,64 as indeed
was exhibited by the Arizona Supreme Court in its first considera-
tion of the Elfbrandt case.65 But the Supreme Court itself has con-
sistently recognized the basis of the distinction, although there
has often been disagreement over its application.66 Accordingly,
whatever limitation Elfbrandt imposes upon the use of political
association as a basis for restricting employment should, according
to precedent, be applicable irrespective of whether the state im-
plements its policy by discharging the employee or by imposing
penal sanctions. Moreover, precedents aside, a different result
would make little sense in terms of any theory of First Amendment
U.S. 36, 56, 68-70 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134, 141-53
(1959); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 412, 414-15 (1958); Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952). It is not entirely clear whether their view
is based primarily on the history of loyalty oaths or on a general suspicion of any
standard that operates with reference to the content of speech. Compare Wieman
and Barenblatt, supra, with Konigsberg. In any event, it is clear that both Justices
recognize the special nature of incidental restrictions on speech where it is clear
that the restriction is not "aimed at speech" and does not "depend for its applica-
tion upon the content of speech." Konigsberg v. State Bar, supra, at 70. See also
Barenblatt v. United States, supra; Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 237, 249, 250-
51 (1942).
60 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See also Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569 (1941); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
61381 U.S. 301 (1965), especially at 307-08 (Brennan, J.).
62 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
63 See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952); Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964).
64 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 334 F.2d 488, 492-96 (9th Cir. 1964), a/firmed
on other grounds, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); Weaver v. Jordan, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537, 543
(1966); In re Schlessinger, 404 Pa. 584 (1961).
65 94 Ariz. at 9-10.
66 See Kalven, supra note 50, at 216.
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protection, especially in view of the fact that, as the Court itself
often has recognized, non-criminal sanctions may often pose more
of a danger to the preservation of protected rights than criminal
sanctions.07
In the light of this background, Mr. Justice White's interpre-
tation of the majority ruling may be nothing more than an artfully
employed "straw man." The failure of the majority opinion to
reply to the dissent on this point probably can be attributed to
Mr. Justice Douglas' views on the art of opinion writing.", The
citation of Scales without mention of the difference in the nature
of the statute there involved can probably be similarly explained.
Mr. Justice Douglas has never been willing to accept the premise
that loyalty oath cases should be treated as indirect restrictions on
speech,"' and, in large degree, he has been unwilling even to ac-
knowledge that previous decisions have drawn a distinction be-
tween statutes like the Smith Act and employment disqualification
provisions.70 Also, since Aptheker, a case involving an indirect re-
straint under the traditional view, had already drawn upon rea-
soning similar to that employed in Scales, the distinction between
the Smith Act and the Arizona legislation may well have been
viewed as without importance for the purpose of applying Scales
to this case.
71
III. Tim ScoPE OF ELFBRANDT: SUB SILENTIO OVERRULING
The rejection of Mr. Justice White's interpretation of the
Court's ruling does not eliminate all the problems presented by
the majority's failure to respond to the argument of the dissent.
There remains in particular the several cases cited by Mr. Justice
White as generally controlling if the majority opinion were not
67 See e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964); Garri-
son v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); see also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
6s See generally Rogat, Mr. Justice Pangloss, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Oct. 22, 1964,
pp. 5-7; see also Kurland, Foreword, "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. Rnv. 143, 167-
68 (1964).
00 See note 60 supra.
70 See, e.g., Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 261 (1961) (dissenting opinion)
(relying on Scales and Yates in a loyalty test case).
71 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1964); cf. United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 456 (1965).
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narrowly based on Arizona's use of criminal sanctions to imple-
ment its loyalty oath.
Six of the eight cases cited by the dissent can be distinguished
without serious difficulty. Four, Lerner v. Casey,72 Beilan v. Board
of Education,73 Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,74 and Slocbo'wer
v. Board of Education,7" deal solely with the right of federal or
state officials to require an employee to reveal any past or present
membership in organizations advocating violent overthrow of the
government.7 6 The determination that state and federal authorities
had this power in no way established that such membership alone is
an adequate basis for denying employment. The Court's rulings
only indicated that the subject of the state's inquiry could be
relevant to some valid standard for disqualification.77 Since a ques-
tion is relevant if it relates to any aspect of the state's standard,
inquiry about membership in an organization advocating over-
throw clearly would be relevant even under a standard that, con-
sistent with Elfbrandt, was limited to exclusion only of those
members who had a specific intent to further the illegal aims of
the organization.
Both Wieman v. Updegraff78 and Adler v. Board of Education7"
deal directly with use of speech and association as a basis for deny-
ing government employment, but they too can be distinguished.
In Wieman, the Court voided an Oklahoma loyalty oath on the
ground that it indiscriminately barred from employment all mem-
bers of organizations advocating violent overthrow regardless of
whether the members were aware of the organization's illegal
72357 U.S. 468 (1958). 74362 U.S. 1 (1960).
73 357 U.S. 399 (1958). 75350 U.S. 551 (1956).
761n Slochower the Court found that the state acted arbitrarily in discharging
the petitioner solely because he relied upon the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to refuse to answer an inquiry concerning past membership in
the Communist party. Beilan, Lerner, and Nelson all upheld discharges under
somewhat similar circumstances when the state based the discharge upon the
employee's general lack of co-operativeness in failing to answer the inquiries,
rather than upon his use of the privilege. See, e.g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,
362 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1960).
7TSee, e.g., Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 474, 477 (1958), where the Court
specifically noted that it need not determine whether the particular standard em-
ployed by the state in that case was valid. See also Beilan v. Board of Education,
357 U.S. 399, 405 (1958); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1, 8 (1960).
78 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 79 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
[1966
HeinOnline  -- 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 208 1966
ELFBRANDT V. RUSSELL 209
purpose. While the opinion did not mention that the oath also
failed to except the member who knew of, but did not share, that
purpose, little significance can be attached to that omission, since
the Court had no reason to consider the need for a "specific in-
tent" requirement once the statute was found unconstitutional on
other grounds.8 0 In Adler, the Court sustained the New York
loyalty program for teachers under the Feinberg Law. The Court's
opinion dealt primarily with a provision making knowing member-
ship in an organization advocating violent overthrow "prima facie
evidence" of disqualification for employment."' Although the
Feinberg Law was supposedly designed to implement a statute
that denied employment to all knowing members of such organi-
zations, 2 the Court's opinion indicates that it assumed, probably
on the basis of a lower court opinion, 3 that an employee could
successfully rebut the prima facie case by showing that he did
not share the illegal aims of the organization."'
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors5 and Garner v. Board of
80 The arguments advanced by the Court in rejecting the Oklahoma oath related
solely to the member who was unaware of the organization's illegal objectives and
were not readily applicable to the knowing member who did not subscribe to the
organization's illegal goals. See 344 U.S. at 190-91.
81 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3022.
82 The Feinberg Law does require the removal of all "subversive persons from
the public school system," but it does not define "subversive persons." The Act
defines subversive organizations, however, as those that advocate, advise, embrace,
or teach the doctrine of violent overthrow. The N.Y. CIvIM SERVICE LAW § 12 (a),
the Act that the Feinberg Law was designed to implement, see 342 U.S. at 487-
89, provides for the disqualification from public employment of any person who
"becomes a member of any ... group ... which teaches or advocates that the
government of the United States or of any state ... shall be overthrown by force
or violence. . . " Accordingly the significance of the provision making member-
ship in such organizations constitute only prima facie evidence of disqualification
is not entirely clear from the face of the statute.
83 See L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, 97 N.Y.S.2d 443, 452-53 (App. Div. 3d
Dept. 1950), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 476 (1950). L'Homnedieu was a companion case to
Adler.
84 See 342 U.S. at 495-96, emphasizing the individual's opportunity to rebut the
prima facie presumption arising from knowing membership. See also id. at 492,
noting that only "unexplained" knowing membership in an organization advocating
overthrow constituted a basis for removal under the New York statute.
The decision in Nostrand v. Little, 368 U.S. 436 (1962), apparently was based
on the same assumption as Adler. See 362 U.S. 474 (1960); 58 Wash.2d 111 (1961).
85 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
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Public Works0 also deal directly with the state's power to deny
employment to individuals solely on the basis of their associations,
but these cases are difficult to distinguish from Elfbrandt. In
Gerende, a unanimous Court, including Justices Black and Douglas,
upheld a Maryland requirement that every candidate for political
office "make oath that he is not a person who is engaged 'in one
way or another in the attempt to overthrow the government by
force or violence,' and that he is not knowingly a member of an
organization engaged in such an attempt."' Although the Mary-
land oath made no exception for knowing members who lacked
the specific intent to support the organization's illegal goals,"'
the Court sustained the state oath requirement in a one-paragraph
per curiam opinion that made no mention of the specific intent
question. Gerende can nevertheless be distinguished from Elf-
brandt on two grounds. First-and this ground will be discussed
more fully-the oath in Gerende was limited to officials with
policy-making functions.8 9 Second, the Maryland oath might be
interpreted as applying only to membership in organizations en-
gaged in a present attempt to overthrow the government. Know-
ing membership in such a group could be distinguished from mem-
bership in a group that had merely advocated violent overthrow
sometime in the future, on the ground that the immediate danger
presented by the first type of organization so clearly established
the individual's support for the organization's illegal objective
that inquiry into his "specific intent" was unnecessary. Such a
narrow interpretation of the Maryland oath, however, is subject
to question. The oath applies to attempts "in one way or another"
to overthrow the government, and this might well require no
more than advocacy itself, especially when it is remembered that
86 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
87 Id. at 56-57. (Emphasis in original.)
88 Moreover, there was nothing in the opinion of the Maryland Court of Appeals
to suggest that a requirement of "specific intent" had been read into the state
statute. See Shub v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177 (1950).
89 See infra, at section VI. Although it is possible that not all elected officials
would possess the type of discretionary authority that might be manipulated to
serve an organization seeking violent overthrow, certainly the group as a whole
can be classified as having such authority. Perhaps, a separate ground of distinction
might be found in the very fact that these officials are elected. See DouGLAs, THE
RiGrr oF nm PnoPir 130 (1958). But there is nothing in the subsequent treatment
of Gerende that indicates the Court considered this an important factor.
HeinOnline  -- 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 210 1966
ELFBRANDT V. RUSSELL 211
the concept of advocacy used in this area is that of urging future
action in language "reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite
persons to such action."' 0 If this broad interpretation of the Mary-
land oath is accepted, then Gerende presents, aside from the first
ground of distinction, the same difficulty in reconciliation with
Elfbrandt as Garner.
In Garner, the Court upheld a statute denying employment to
any person who within five years had been a knowing member of
any organization that "advised, advocated, or taught the over-
throw by force or violence" of the state or federal government. 1
Although no mention of the point was made in either the majority
or dissenting opinions (including those of Justices Black and Doug-
las),02 the statute in Garner clearly would exclude from employ-
ment knowing members who lacked the specific intent to further
the organization's unlawful aims.93 Garner therefore seems, at
least on the surface, to be in direct conflict with Elfbrandt. Yet,
cases are not ordinarily overruled sub silentio,94 and Mr. Justice
00 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 316 (1957); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 511-12 (1951). The same standard is ordinarily applied to loyalty
oaths. See, e.g., 94 Ariz. at 8. Of course, Gerende was decided before Dennis and
Yates, but this would not have prevented the Court from viewing "Yates-style"
advocacy as constituting an attempt "in one way or another to overthrow the
government by force and violence."
01341 U.S. at 717-18.
92 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
concentrated entirely on the contention that the Los Angeles ordinance was a bill
of attainder. See 341 U.S. at 731-33. Mr. Justice Black's short dissenting opinion
briefly mentioned the First Amendment issue, but discussed it in general terms. Id.
at 730-31. Both Mr. Justice Frankfurter's separate opinion and Mr. Justice Clark's
opinion for the Court did discuss that issue, however, in connection with the pos-
sible application of the ordinance to members who were unaware of an organiza-
tion's illegal activity, the majority assuming that the statute incorporated a require-
ment of scienter, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter finding the statute unconstitutional
because that assumption reasonably could not be made. Id. at 720-21, 723-24, 724.
93 But see Horowitz, Report on the Los Angeles City and County Loyalty Pro-
grams, 5 SrTANFoiw L. Rav. 233, 244 (1953), possibly suggesting that the element of
scienter read into the ordinance in Garner might make the ordinance inapplicable
to the "employee [who] was a member of the organization but continually fought
against policies of overthrow." The language of Garner, however, quite clearly
discussed scienter strictly in terms of knowledge rather than intent. 341 U.S. at
723-24. This was reaffimed in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
94 See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, [1963] SuPRm
Couar Rzvmw 211, 214 n. 15, 215-26.
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Douglas' opinion failed to mention the Garner case. It could rea-
sonably be assumed that there was a basis for reconciling the
two cases, and that Garner remains controlling precedent until
explicitly overruled."5
A ground for reconciling Garner and Elfbrandt in fact can be
found, if not without difficulty. The Garner statute applied to mem-
bership in organizations that were actively engaged in the advocacy
of violent overthrow, and the Court obviously treated it as aimed at
the Communist party or similar organizations that made the over-
throw of the government a dominant organizational goal.906 Elf-
brandt, on the other hand, involves a statute prohibiting employee
membership in an organization that has the violent overthrow of the
government merely as "one of its purposes. 97 As Justice Bernstein
noted in the Arizona court, the Arizona statute would encompass an
organization for which overthrow was merely a "subordinate pur-
pose."98 Both Justice Bernstein and Mr. Justice Douglas mentioned
the possible application of the Arizona statute to a teacher's mem-
bership in a seminar group dominated by Communist scientists. Cer-
tainly, a member of such a group cannot be compared to a member
of an organization like the Communist party, either in terms of his
contribution to the potential violent overthrow of the government
or his lack of dedication to the present form of government.9 9 The
Court could have adopted the position that membership in such an
organization does not justify employment disqualification without a
showing of the individual's support for the policy of violent over-
throw, although knowing membership in an organization like the
Communist party would be sufficient justification for disqualifica-
tion. In any event, the argument might continue, since Elfbrandt
95 Cf. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S.
103, 112 (1927), noting the need for caution in drawing "inferences from silence."
96 See 341 U.S. at 719-20. The oath was combined with a requirement that every
employee execute an affidavit stating whether he had ever been a member of the
Communist party. Ibid.
97 See note 9 supra. 98 97 Ariz. at 148; see text supra, at note 19.
99 It might also be argued that a restriction extending to any organization that
might have violent overthrow as "one of its purposes" would impose a greater
deterrent to free association because the employee would have greater concern
about not being able to recognize all the subordinate organizational purposes. The
statute in Elfbrandt was limited to members with knowledge, but the impact of
that safeguard upon the individual's willingness freely to join various organizations
is questionable.
[1966
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went no further than to declare invalid a law covering the first situa-
tion, Garner still remains a valid precedent until the Court faces a
statute dealing solely with membership in groups actively advocat-
ing overthrow.
Support for this view of the limited scope of the Elfbrandt opin-
ion can be found in various portions of Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion.
Justice Bernstein's dissent, which was based entirely on the "sub-
ordinate purpose" theme, is quoted at length in the majority opin-
ion. 00 Mr. Justice Douglas also added his own discussion of the same
point, including his hypotheticals concerning teacher participation
in such events as the Pugwash Conference. Finally, throughout the
majority opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas spoke solely in terms of
organizations with an illegal "purpose" or "aim." No reference is
made to membership in an organization presendy advocating over-
throw.110 Nevertheless, although these elements of the majority
opinion give this reading of the Court's ruling far more support than
that suggested by Mr. Justice White, it too should be rejected.
If Elfbrandt is viewed as going no further than to invalidate a
statute so broad as to encompass membership in a scientific seminar
dominated by Communists, it becomes very difficult indeed to un-
derstand why the case was not clearly controlled by Baggett v.
Bullitt,10 2 and, if so, why (1) two members of the Baggett majority
dissented in Elfbrandt'0 3 and (2) the majority relied primarily on
Scales, and Aptbeker rather than Baggett. In Baggett, the Court,
with only Justices Clark and Harlan dissenting, held unconstitution-
al a Washington statute that barred from public employment all
persons, inter alia, who "aid[ed] in the commission of any act in-
tended to overthrow, destroy, or alter or assist in the overthrow, de-
struction, or alteration" of the state or federal government.'0 4 While
Mr. Justice White's opinion for the Court was based on the ground
that the statute was unduly vague, this rationale was keyed to the
impact of the statute on First Amendment rights. The vagueness in
the Washington statute entered the picture primarily because a
100 384 U.S. at 14-15. The quotation included the entire discussion by Justice
Bernstein of the "scientist' hypothetical.
101 See, e.g., 384 U.S. at 16, 17. 102 377 US. 360 (1964).
103 The majority in Baggett included Justices White and Stewart, both of whom
dissented in Elftbrandt.
104 377 U.S. at 362.
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literal interpretation of the statute so clearly imposed on protected
speech that the Court assumed that a somewhat narrower, but less
well defined, compass was intended.10 In listing the obviously im-
permissible bases for denial of employment that could fall within
the state statute if literally interpreted, Mr. Justice White offered
an illustration almost identical to that cited by Mr. Justice Douglas
in Elfbrandt-the denial of employment to a scholar who "attends
and participates in an international convention of mathematicians
and exchanges views with scholars from Communist countries." 100,
Mr. Justice White's discussion of this and other illustrations clearly
indicated that the state could not deny employment to an individ-
ual simply because he unintentionally lent indirect aid to the
"cause" of violent overthrow by engaging in lawful activities that
he knew might add to the power of persons supporting illegal
overthrow.1 7 Thus, although the Washington statute, when read
literally, was much broader in scope than the statute in Elfbrandt,
the basic principle expressed in the Baggett opinion clearly would
control Elfbrandt if that case were viewed as concerned primarily
with the application of the Arizona statute to such matters as mem-
bership in a Communist-dominated scientific seminar.
While the Court's opinion in Elfbrandt does cite Baggett v.
105 Id. at 366-68. The opinion of the Court does not clearly express the interrela-
tionship of the vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth of the statute when it is
read literally. This point is given more explicit recognition, however, in a subse-
quent opinion that relied primarily on Baggett. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 US.
479, 486-87, 490-92, 493-94 (1965); see also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 515-16 (1964); United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36
(1963); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1960) (dissenting opinion); Amsterdam, The Void for
Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
106 377 U.S. at 369.
107 Although the Court's opinion in Baggett raises some question concerning the
nature of the individual's awareness that his acts would aid those seeking over-
throw, the opinion also indicates that the activity discussed would be protected
even if the individual knew "that his aid or teaching would be used by another
and that the person aided has the requisite guilty intent." The discussion relating
to the possible ambiguity in the oath's scienter requirement was discussed as a
supplementary point. See 377 U.S. at 368-69. See also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 492-93. Dombrowski also indicates that the protection afforded by Bag-
gett would be equally applicable to the person who is a member of an organization
that itself lends indirect and unintended aid to those supporting overthrow by
participating for other purposes in legal activities that will strengthen the posi-
tion of such groups. Ibid.
[1966
HeinOnline  -- 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 214 1966
ELFERANDT V. RUSSELL 215
Bullitt in connection with the discussion of the hypotheticals con-
cerning scientific conferences, it does not rely heavily on that deci-
sion.108 Both the citation and the hypotheticals seem to serve merely
to supplement the argument for requiring an element of "specific
intent" by presenting an extreme example of what could happen
when a loyalty oath contained no exemption of members who
lacked such intent. The primary emphasis in Elfbrandt is on Scales
and Aptheker, both of which involved membership in the Com-
munist party. 0 9 Reliance on these decisions, when Baggett was
otherwise sufficient precedent, indicates that the Court's rejection
of employment disqualification based solely on knowing member-
ship in an organization supporting the violent overthrow of the
government extends to all such organizations, including those in
which violent overthrow is a matter of primary emphasis. Garner v.
Board of Public Works must, therefore, be viewed as overruled.
Admittedly, the assumption that the Court overruled an earlier
precedent sub silentio is not to be lightly indulged. But two recent
opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas seem to overrule several other cases
in this manner."10 And certainly the thrust of the majority opinion,
as well as the cases cited therein, indicates that Garner was intended
to share the same fate.
Actually, there are a few statements in Elfbrandt suggesting that
a statute like that in Garner would be deficient on not one but two
grounds. While Mr. Justice Douglas' several statements of the
Court's ruling in the majority opinion consistently refer only to
the improper disqualification of the knowing member who lacks
"a 'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization,"
a few comments in the opinion suggest that even a statutory re-
striction on employment limited to members with "specific intent"
would not be valid. For example, in citing the Scales case, Mr.
Justice Douglas noted that the majority there read the Smith Act
"membership clause" to require not only that the member have
the requisite intent but also that he be an "active" member."' At
another point, the opinion might be taken to suggest that even
"active" participation in the group's activities would not be enough
108 384 U.S. at 16-17. 109 See 367 U.S. at 205-06, 378 U.S. at 504-05.
110 See Kurland, supra note 68, at 150, 167-68, discussing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963), and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
111384 U.S. at 15; see 367 U.S. at 222-24, 255 n. 29.
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if the activities involved were all legal. Mr. Justice Douglas stated
that those "who join an organization but do not share its unlawful
purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities surely
pose no threat to society.""' 2 While this could be viewed as sug-
gesting alternative requirements, it may indicate that the Court
will not allow employment disqualification to be based on political
association absent a showing of specific intent to promote the vio-
lent overthrow of the government plus previous participation in
illegal activities serving that end. Some support for this second
requirement might also be found in Mr. Justice Douglas' statement
that a statute denying employment on the basis of speech-related
activities must be "narrowly drawn to define and punish specific
conduct as constituting a clear and present danger to a substantial
interest of the state." The clear-and-present-danger standard, espe-
cially as viewed by Mr. Justice Douglas, could easily be taken to re-
quire prior participation in illegal activity."3
If these statements do not in themselves impose any additional re-
quirements, they lay the foundation for a future decision to that
effect." 4 Whether the Court's ruling will be expanded to require
active membership or even actual participation in illegal activities
will depend in large part on the precise nature of the considerations
that led the Court to reject Arizona's reliance upon knowing mem-
bership as an appropriate basis for denying government employ-
ment. The nature of those considerations will also have considera-
ble bearing on whether Elfbrandt will be applied to a statute re-
quiring loyalty oaths of only a limited group of employees, such
as those in sensitive positions. Unfortunately, however, the identi-
fication of these relevant considerations is hidden to a large degree
112 384 U.S. at 17.
113 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (dissenting
opinion).
114 The dissent at one point suggested that the majority did impose a require-
ment of active membership. See 384 U.S. at 22-23: "[T]he Court errs in holding
that the act is overbroad because it includes state employees who are knowing
members but who may not he active and who may lack the specific intent to
further the illegal aims of the Party."
The majority opinion, however, refers to an "active" membership requirement
only in connection with its general description of the Scales case. Id. at 15. The
discussion of Aptheker, the reference to the possible scope of the statute, and the
summary of the Court's ruling at the end of the opinion speak only of the element
of "specific intent." Id. at 16-19.
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by the manner in which the Elf brandt opinion utilized the rule
against overbroadness as the basis for its ruling.
IV. OVERBROADNESS AND THE NATURE OF THE STATE'S INTERESTS
The rule against overbreadth in legislation affecting First
Amendment rights is a doctrine very much favored by the present
Court."8 In large part, this is probably due to the fact that it rep-
resents one of the few common meeting grounds for the variant
views of the meaning of the First Amendment.116 But, as one might
expect of a doctrine serving this function, the rule is frequently
used in different ways by different Justices in writing opinions for
the Court. Thus, in some cases, the Court would seem to have
rejected legislation as overbroad primarily because the means em-
ployed by the state bore little or no relationship to the interests it
sought to implement. 117 In other cases, the Court has acknowledged
the presence of a substantial relationship, but has still found the
legislation invalid because the state interest could be attained by an
alternative means that would impose less severe restrictions on the
individual's personal liberty."" In still other cases, the Court seemed
to reject legislation because, whatever the possible alternative
1N See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-44
(1963); Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62-64 (1960).
110 SHAPIRO, FREDom. OF SPENCH: THE SuPREM CouRT Alm JuDIcLAL REVIEw 140-
41 (1966). Compare Justices Douglas' and Black's joining opinion for the Court in
Shelton v. Tucker, supra note 115, 'with their use of a separate concurring opinion
in Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960).
117See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 115; Tafley v. California, supra
note 115; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Frequently, as in Lovell and, per-
haps, Talley, there is the further suggestion that the restriction upon speech was
so significant that the statute would not be sustained even if it did bear a rela-
tionship to some state interest. In fact, the decisions probably rested on this ground,
since the state's use of an absolute prohibition against the distribution of all litera-
ture, as in Lovell, or all anonymous handbills, as in Talley, does serve the state's
interest in eliminating obscene or libelous publications in the sense that the flat pro-
hibition against distribution obviously is considerably easier to administer than
one that attempted to specify what literature might fall in the obscene or libelous
category. Cf. Note, The Supreme Court, 19S9 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 97, 130
(1960).
118 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, supra note 115; Shelton v. Tucker,
supra note 115; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1942).
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means, the state interest served by the legislation was deemed in-
sufficient to justify the extensive restriction it imposed upon pro-
tected speech or association.119 While these varying uses of the
"overbroadness" doctrine all rest on the same basic process of evalu-
ating competing interests, the differences in underlying rationale
may be relevant in determining the degree to which the rejection
of legislation as "overbroad" might preclude an attempt to satisfy
the same state interest through different means. Yet, opinions rely-
ing upon the "overbroadness" rule often provide no more indica-
tion of the Court's analysis than a conclusionary statement that a
particular aspect of the statutory infringement on speech was overly
broad as it applied to the particular interest that the state advanced
in that case.120 The majority opinion in Elfbrandt fits this pattern
and, indeed, is more delinquent, since the Court failed in large part
even to identify the state interest against which the legislation was
balanced.
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion starts with a description and evalu-
ation of the interest of the individual in joining organizations hav-
ing both legal and illegal objectives, and, except for one or two
sentences, it never leaves that aspect of the case. Although the
opinion states in conclusion that the Arizona statute "infringes un-
necessarily on protected freedoms," it never clearly defines the
state interests in relation to which the infringement was deemed
"unnecessary."'12' The lack of any extended discussion of the state's
interest is not surprising in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, who
generally seeks to avoid creating any impression that the Court
might be engaged in "balancing" individual rights against a state's
interests. 2 12 In the area of the legislation involved in Elfbrandt,
19 See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra note 115; Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P.,
supra note 115. See also Shelton v. Tucker, supra note 115, at 493 n. 3 (dissenting
opinion).
120 See, e.g., Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., supra note 115; Talley v. California, supra
note 115.
121 384 U.S. at 19. Although relying upon Aptbeker for other purposes, the opin-
ion ignores the statement in Aptheker that application of the rule against over-
broadness requires examination of the state's interest. See Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, supra note 115, at 508.
122 Consider, for example, his treatment of the state's interest in the following
description of N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama and Bates v. Little Rock, as they relate to
the power to compel disclosure of membership lists: 'We deal with a constitu-
tional right, since freedom of association is included in the bundle of First Amend-
ment rights made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
[1966
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however, this omission takes on special significance, since at least
three different state interests are commonly advanced to justify
disqualification of individuals from public employment on the basis
of membership in organizations advocating the violent overthrow
of the government: (1) The elimination of persons who present a
potential for sabotage, espionage, or other activities directly in-
jurious to national security. (2) The elimination of persons who are
likely to be either incompetent or untrustworthy in the perform-
ance of their duties. (3) The elimination of persons who, aside
from any question of danger or fitness, simply are not considered
deserving of a government position because they oppose the basic
principles on which the government is founded. The Elfbrandt
opinion contains no reference to any of these interests aside from
a single ambiguous sentence. In that sentence, Mr. Justice Douglas
emphasized that members who do not share an organization's un-
lawful purposes and never participate in its unlawful activities
"surely pose no threat, either as citizens or as public employees."' 23
The nature of the "threat" to which Mr. Justice Douglas is refer-
ring is not entirely clear, but the context of the sentence indicates
that he was probably making reference only to the possibility of
sabotage or similar activities. Since all three state interests were
advanced in justification of the Arizona legislation, however, either
in the briefs or in the opinions below,124 it must be assumed that
the Court found the statute unnecessarily broad as applied to all
of them. And, as previously noted, the considerations that led the
Court to reject these interests will determine the possibilities for
the extension of the Elfbrandt ruling to loyalty oaths more limited
than Arizona's. 25
teenth Amendment ... [ecitations omitted]. And where it is shown, as it was in
N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, supra, 462-463, that disclosure of membership lists results
in reprisals against and hostility to the members, disclosure is not required. And
see Bates v. Little Rock, supra, 523-524." Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P., supra note 115,
at 296.
123 384 U.S. at 17.
124 Although the respondents brief placed emphasis upon the first of the state
interests mentioned above, the opinion of the lower court made reference to the
other two. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 8, 13; 94 Ariz. at 6, 10-11. See also the
Report of the Arizona Judiciary Committee in Support of the Committee Amend-
ment to H.B. 115, reproduced as Appendix B in Respondents brief.
125 Of course, even if the opinion had clearly identified the state's interest and
explained why the statute was overbroad in relation to those interests, the Court
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V. THE DENIAL OF SUPPORT TO DISLOYAL GROUPS
It has frequently been argued that persons who lack "fidelity
to the very presuppositions of our scheme of government" should
be denied public employment simply because the government need
not support those who oppose it.126 Taxpayers' funds," so the
argument goes, "should not be spent to support . . a person of
doubtful loyalty to the very governmental system for which he
wants to work. ' 127 Or, to look at it from the other side, the state
should be allowed to promote loyalty to our basic institutions by
employing only those who accept those institutions.'28
Although this argument probably serves as the primary basis for
much of our "loyalty" legislation,129 the state interest it advances
has not always been recognized as separate from that of excluding
need not have committed itself on the weight of those interests in the case of a
modified statute. See Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Ap-
preciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1,
15-17 (1965). Yet that would be the inevitable result of reliance upon several of
the possible grounds for judgment that are discussed in the next three sections of
this article.
126 Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (concurring opin-
ion). See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 205, 333, 335, 337; Linde, Justice Douglas
on Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 WAsH. L. REv. 39 (1964) (both noting the
argument, but not supporting it).
127 Linde, supra note 126, at 39. As used in this argument, "disloyalty" means
only the denial of the basic premises on which the government is founded. In the
case of persons believing in violent overthrow, it is the denial of the premise that
change in government can take place only through the democratic means provided
by the Constitution. See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 6-7, 389.
Another concept of loyalty sometimes advanced in connection with this argu-
ment rests on the individual's alleged subservience to a foreign nation. See, e.g.,
ARiz. REv. STAT., tit. 16, ch. 2, § 16-205 (1965 Supp.) (Arizona Communist Control
Act). This concept, however, does not relate to all groups advocating overthrow
of the government, and it has been employed primarily in connection with Com-
munist Control Acts. It could provide an entirely separate basis for denial of sup-
port through employment disqualification. See People v. Crane, 124 N.Y. 154, 161,
164 (1915), aff'd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915). But it would present essentially the same diffi-
culties as Elfbrandt with respect to the need for a showing that the individual mem-
ber owed his allegiance to a foreign country.
12 8 Cf. First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 48 Cal.2d 419, 438-39
(1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
12 9 See Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment through Conditioned Public
Spending, 41 CoaLL L.Q. 12, 48 (1955); Linde, supra note 126, at 39; BROWN, op.
cit supra note 5, at 337, 340.
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potentially unreliable and incompetent employees. The two inter-
ests do often overlap, but they are distinct in one important re-
spect.13 0 The state's interest in obtaining fit employees relates to
the individual's potential performance in public employment, while
its interest in denying support to "disloyal" persons may relate
only to the individual's attitude toward basic principles of consti-
tutional government.131 Thus, associational ties that might not be
adequate to establish the likelihood that a person will act improp-
erly in office may nevertheless be sufficient to show a lack of "loy-
alty," for example, in the individual's acceptance of a general theory
that the violent overthrow of government is preferable to the con-
stitutional processes for change provided in the Constitution.
The Court in Elfbrandt obviously found that the state interest
in denying support to "disloyal" persons could not justify the Ari-
zona loyalty oath. That conclusion may have been based on at least
two distinct approaches, each furnishing somewhat different im-
plications of the future effect of the decision. On the more limited
approach, the Court may have agreed that the state has an interest
in denying support to "disloyal" persons but still have found that
the Arizona statute was not sufficiently related to that interest.
Since, under the state's theory, the basis for denial of employment
turns on the individual's rejection of the basic principles of consti-
tutional government, the loyalty oath, to implement that theory,
logically should exclude only those members who themselves sub-
scribe to the illegal objective of violent overthrow.132 The Arizona
statute, as related to this state interest, could very properly be
described as unnecessarily broad. A ruling based on this analysis
would go no further than to require that the element of "specific
intent" be added to the "membership clause" of § 5. The addition
of an element of active participation in the organization's affairs
would not be needed, since, as noted, "disloyalty" for the purpose
of this theory need not be related to action.
130 See BRowI, supra note 5, at 205. See also 94 Ariz. at 6, 10-11.
131 See note 127 supra. See also Sacks, Federal Civilian Employees Security Pro-
gram: An Analysis of the Wright Commission Report, 52 Nw. U. L. Rav. 715, 719
(1958).
132 The Court adopted a similar view in interpreting the requirement of "attach-
ment to the principles of the constitution" under the Nationality Act of 1906. See
Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Maisenberg v. United States, 356 U.S.
670 (1958).
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This analysis would not in itself answer the argument, suggested
by the dissent, that the individual by lending "his name and in-
fluence" to the organization automatically aided its illegal objec-
tives, whatever his intent, and that the state could, therefore, ex-
clude him from employment as a means of denying support to a
"disloyal" organization. 113 On this point, the Court would be re-
quired to answer that the state's justification for a loyalty oath must
relate directly to the denial of support to the individual, rather than
to the organization, since it is the individual who suffers the brunt
of the restriction. Some support for this position may be found in
Wieman v. Updegraff,134 where the Court held that the state could
not deny employment to members of organizations advocating
overthrow who were not aware that the organization had this ob-
jective. Certainly, a member in that category could give the organi-
zation as much aid by lending it "his name and influence" as the
knowing member who did not share the organization's purpose. 135
While there is a significant difference in the fact that the member
in the second case has knowledge of the organization's illegal goals,
Baggett v. Bullitt indicates that, at least in the case of somewhat
more indirect assistance such as united activity in support of a
joint political objective, it matters not that the individual realizes
that his assistance will indirectly further the organization's illegal
objectives. 36 Membership in an organization actually advocating
overthrow may, of course, constitute a much more direct contri-
bution to its illegal objectives. But when the importance Wiernan
attached to freedom of association is also considered, the Court
might well conclude that the state's interest in shutting off this
additional element of organizational support was insufficient to out-
weigh the restriction on individual freedom. In sum then, under
this first approach, the Arizona oath would be rejected because
(1) the state's interest in denying support to "disloyal" persons is
not sufficient so long as the individual does not himself subscribe
133 384 US. at 20. This argument was also suggested in the Arizona Supreme
Court. See 94 Ariz. at 10-11.
134 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
135 The Court has recognized that an individual can be an active member of an
organization and still not be aware of its illegal objective. See Nowak v. United
States, supra note 132; Maisenberg v. United States, supra note 132; cf. Rowoldt v.
Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
136 See text at note 107 supra.
[1966
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to an organization's illegal goals, and (2) the state's interest in de-
nying the organization whatever support comes from the member-
ship of a person who does not favor its illegal ends is not sufficient
to justify restricting that individual's right to join that organization
in order to work for a legal objective he does favor.
A second and more far-reaching approach to both aspects of this
problem would hold that the state's interest in denying support to
"disloyal" persons or organizations is never a proper basis for em-
ployment disqualification, except possibly where the grounds of dis-
qualification are limited to speech or association that could be directly
proscribed under the Constitution. At the outset, it should be noted
that the Court never has had occasion directly to accept or reject
the principle that a state can base a loyalty test on its desire to
deny employment to those persons who reject the basic principles
of constitutional government. Scattered statements in one or two
opinions might be taken as recognizing the state's interest in this
regard, but these opinions dealt primarily with other state goals.'
Moreover, these opinions were written before Speiser v. Randall. 8
13
7 See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 US. 716, 725 (1951) (concurring
opinion); Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492-93 (1952). The state-
ments in Adler are ambiguous because the Court never defines the term "loyalty"
when it speaks of determining "fitness and loyalty." Moreover, the various state-
ments in Adler emphasizing the so-called privilege rationale were sharply limited
only a year later in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1953).
188 357 U.S. 513 (1958). One post-Speiser statement that could be bracketed with
the cases cited in note 137 is found in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
The Court there sustained a statutory provision disqualifying from social security
benefits persons who "had been deported on several grounds, including mem-
bership in the Communist Party." The Court noted that a rational justification
for the statute might rest on the deportee's inability to aid the domestic economy
by spending the benefits locally. The opinion then went on to make the following
statements: "For these purposes, it is, of course, constitutionally irrelevant whether
this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision, as it is irrelevant that the
section does not extend to all to whom the postulated rationale might in logic apply.
... Nor, apart from this, can it be deemed irrational for Congress to have con-
cluded that the public purse should not be utilized to contribute to the support
of those deported on the grounds specified in the statute."
It is not entirely clear whether the last sentence refers to the fact that the deportee
would be residing abroad or whether it establishes a right to deny support simply
because alien Communists are not "deserving" of benefits. See Linde, supra note
126, at 17, suggesting the latter interpretation. In any event, subsequent cases, ap-
parently viewing Flenming as based entirely on the first rationale, have treated
Speiser and Flenming as consistent in the general principle each applied. See, e.g.,
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05, 409 n. 9 (1963).
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In Speiser the Court held unconstitutional a California statute
requiring every applicant for a veteran's tax exemption to swear
that he was not presently advocating the violent overthrow of the
federal or state government. The California statute was based on
essentially the same state interest as is advanced to deny employ-
ment to "disloyal" persons. It was designed to "encourage ... loy-
alty to our institutions" by denying support of persons who advo-
cated the violent overthrow of those institutions. 39 Unlike the
Arizona loyalty oath, however, the standard for denial of benefits
was limited to speech that had been held to be outside the protec-
tion of the First Amendment.140 The Court, therefore, did not have
to deal directly with the question whether the denial of tax benefits
could have been based on speech that could not be directly pro-
hibited under the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion
indicated quite clearly that if such exemptions can be denied on the
basis of speech at all, it must be on the basis of "proscribed speech
for which [the individual] might be fined or imprisoned."'' In
particular, the opinion emphasized that legislation serving the func-
tion of the California statute constituted a direct restraint on speech,
since it was "frankiy aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,"
rather than the control of particular conduct relating to the benefit
granted . 42 The Court carefully distinguished prior loyalty oath
cases, such as Gerende, on the ground that the "principal aim of
those statutes was not to penalize political beliefs but to deny posi-
tions to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position
might be misused to the detriment of the public."'143 Finally, the
Court, relying in part on Wieman v. Updegraff, rejected the argu-
ment that tax exemptions constituted a privilege and therefore were
not subject to constitutional limitations upon the infringement of
speech. 4
4
In light of Speiser, a loyalty oath justified solely in terms of the
state's interest in denying support to "disloyal" persons, as opposed
to an interest in insuring employee reliability, must be viewed as a
139 357 US. at 527. See also statement of Clark, J., dissenting: "The interest of
the State ... is dual in nature, but its primary thrust is summed up in an under-
standable desire to insure that those who benefit by tax exemption do not bite
the hand that gives it." Id. at 543.
140 Id. at 519-20. 142 Id. at 519.
141 Id. at 520. 143 ad. at 527. 144 Id. at 518-19.
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direct restraint on speech. It follows that the only permissible stand-
ard for an oath serving that interest would be one tied, as in Speiser,
to speech or association that might generally be made criminal un-
der such legislation as the Smith Act.' 45 Moreover, even if the
standard employed were to meet the requirements of the Scales
case, for example, there still might be some question about its valid-
ity when used in the context of a loyalty oath. Speiser only assumed
arguendo that a state could deny benefits solely on "disloyalty"
grounds where the speech involved was directly punishable.' 46 The
opinion then went on to reject the California statute because, in
any event, it improperly shifted the burden of proof. In reaching
this result, Speiser compared the California provision to a statute
imposing a penalty for a crime. 47 Extending this reasoning, the
Court might well rule, if forced to meet the issue, that a loyalty
requirement "frankly aimed at suppressing speech," even if lim-
ited to constitutionally prohibitible speech, would still be invalid
because it fails to afford the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment.
148
This would, in effect, reject any state employment test designed
as a means of denying support to "disloyal" persons or organiza-
tions unless the standards under that test were relevant also to the
quality of the employee's performance on the job.
Even if Speiser is not extended to its logical extreme, its appli-
cation to the area of government employment still presents the
problem of distinguishing (or rejecting) two "practical" precedents
that are often cited to justify loyalty qualifications for government
employees. The first is the traditional practice of hiring and firing
under the spoils system that was so prevalent in this country before
the advent of civil service (and is still not unheard of today) .149
If Republicans can deny employment to Democrats simply because
they are Democrats, why not, it is asked, permit both parties to
exclude persons who believe in the overthrow of the government?
145 See Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1952); cf. Danstin
v. School Board, 28 Cal.2d 536 (1946); United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848
(E.D. Wisc. 1942).
146 357 U.S. at 519-20.
147 Id. at 525, citing Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
148 Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 184 n. 39 (1963) (relying
on Lipke v. Lederer, supra note 147).
140 See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 59-60, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by
equally divided aourt, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (collecting sources).
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A possible answer could be that the spoils system was basically a
product of a different era in which the characterization of employ-
ment as a privilege carried far more weight than it does today.11°
But the better answer is that the patronage system of employment
has operated behind the Court's general refusal to examine the basis
of the government's employment decisions unless the grounds for
those decisions are clearly announced.115 If the basic premise of
the spoils system, insofar as it is not related to fitness, were clearly
stated in statute or regulation, it would be rejected as arbitrary.
This point seems clear from United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
where the Court noted that "none would deny" that "Congress
may not enact a regulation providing that no Republican, Jew, or
Negro shall be appointed to federal office."'
52
The second precedent relied upon is the general requirement
that government employees take an oath swearing to "bear true
faith and allegiance" to the government, to "support and defend
the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic," and to
"faithfully discharge the duties of [public] office."' 53 An "affirma-
five" oath of this nature has been required of federal employees in
the executive branch since 1884,1'5 and a somewhat similar oath
is required of the President by Article II of the Constitution. The
contents of the oath, particularly the general requirement of de-
fense of the Constitution, seems to indicate that it extends to mat-
ters beyond the individual's performance in office. Accordingly, it
is argued that a requirement that employees believe in democratic
processes for change, as opposed to violent overthrow, merely
restates in a more specific fashion the employee's affirmative duty
to defend the Constitution and to bear true allegiance to the gov-
ernment formed under the Constitution. 55 The short answer here
150 See generally Wilcox, supra note 129, at 12-15, 37-44. Compare HeLm v.
McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915), ,with Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192
(1952). See also Powell, The Right To Work for the State, 16 CoLuM. L. REv. 99
(1916).
151 See, e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
152 330 U.S. at 100.
153 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1964). See Constanzo, Loyalty Oath Affidavit, 37 U. DaF. L. J.
718, 728 (1960); Wilcox, supra note 129, at 49.
1
5 4 See 5 U.S.C. § 16 (1964); 23 Stat. 22 (1884).
155 The fact that the affirmative oaths refer to future conduct and therefore would
not likely be enforced by a perjury prosecution would not in itself serve as an
[1966
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is that the affirmative oath of allegiance refers only to positive acts
in violation of a constitutionally imposed legal duty. In In re Sum-
mers,""' for example, the Court, in finding that a person unwilling
to bear arms could not conscientiously take the oath to "support
the Constitution," specifically rested its conclusion on the assump-
tion that the draft exemption for conscientious objectors was not
constitutionally required and that the failure of a conscientious
objector to bear arms could validly be made a crime. Similarly,
the affirmative oath, if it applies to speech at all, creates a duty to
abstain only from such seditious speech or association as could be
directly prohibited consistent with the Constitution. This would
be entirely consistent with at least the more limited view of Speiser
v. Randall as restricting the basis for the denial of benefits "to
proscribed speech for which [the individual] might be imprisoned
or fined."''
7
As previously noted, the Court's opinion in Elfbrandt does not
clearly indicate why it found the state's interest in denying sup-
port to "disloyal" persons insufficient to justify the Arizona loyalty
oath. The Court probably did not advance beyond the first ap-
proach suggested above, that membership without specific intent
to further illegal objectives bore an insufficient relationship to the
state interest. The more broadly based ground would have required
a discussion of Speiser, and that case was cited only once and for
a different point.1G8 On the other hand, four members of the Elf-
brandt majority had previously urged a very broad interpretation
adequate basis for distinguishing the loyalty oath. See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 374 (1964): "Without the criminal sanctions, it is said, one need not fear
taking this oath .... This contention ignores not only the effect of the oath on
those who will not solemnly swear unless they can do so honestly and without
prevarication and reservation, but also its effect on those who believe the written
law means what it says:'
150 325 US. 561, 569-73 (1945). Summers involved the duty to support the
state constitution (Illinois), but, at that time, a similar construction had been placed
upon the requirement of support of the federal constitution in the oath of allegiance
required by the Naturalization Act of 1906. See United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), overruled
by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1945). The Girouard case found that
Congress had not intended to make willingness to bear arms an absolute prerequisite
to citizenship.
157 See note 141 supra.
158 384 U.S. at 17-18.
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of Speiser in another context.5 9 Perhaps they viewed Speiser as so
clearly rejecting this interest that no discussion was necessary. If
this is true, Elfbrandt will have bearing beyond the employment
situation and may, along with Speiser, provide the basis for reject-
ing such loyalty restrictions as that imposed under the recent Medi-
care legislation.160
VI. THE STATE'S INTEREST N IN sRI NG THE, Fin-ss
OF ITS EMPLOYEES
The ruling in Elfbrandt indicates also that the Arizona oath
requirement could not be sustained by the state's interest in insur-
ing the fitness of its employees. Here again the significance of the
decision will depend in large degree on which of two somewhat
different rationales led the Court to this conclusion.
The first rationale would be based primarily on the total coverage
of the Arizona statute. Although petitioner in Elfbrandt happened
to be a teacher, the Arizona oath was required of all state and local
employees, including janitors, street cleaners, and others with pure-
ly ministerial functions.161 As applied to persons in these positions,
the case for determining the prospective employee's potential per-
formance on the basis of his membership in an organization advocat-
ing overthrow is very weak. The traditional argument for denying
state employment to members of such organizations has rested on
the likelihood that they would use their positions to strengthen the
organization's ability eventually to attempt violent overthrow by
(1) promoting the organization's influence through favoritism in
the distribution of governmental benefits to those groups sympa-
159 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 75-80, 80-81 (1961) (dissenting opin-
ions). See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice
Black, in Speiser. 357 U.S. at 532, 535-38.
16 0 See 79 Stat. 333 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 427 (note) (Supp. 1965). This section
generally extends hospital benefits to persons not insured under Social Security
or Railroad Retirement, but makes an exception for a member of any organization
ordered by the Subversive Activities Control Board to register as a Communist
organization under the Internal Security Act of 1950. See also the various provisions
cited in Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1595, 1601-02 (1960).
161 Aviz. REv. STAT. § 38-231 (B), (C) (1965). The Arizona oath was required
of "any person elected, appointed or employed, either on a part-time or full-time
basis by the state or any of its political subdivisions or any county, city, town,
municipal corporation, school district, public educational institution, or any board,
commission or agency of any of the foregoing." Ibid.
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thetic to the organization's goals and (2) using government power
to achieve social and economic conditions that are prerequisites to a
successful attempt at revolution. 6 2 Typical examples offered in sup-
port of this position are the employees of legislative committees who
attempted "to manipulate hearings so as to favor the friends of the
party and depreciate its enemies,'"las and the public school teachers
who used their position to indoctrinate students through the teach-
ing of "a prescribed party line."' 64 While the Court has previously
accepted the state's interest in preventing such misuse of office as an
appropriate basis for imposing loyalty restrictions on teachers' 65 and
lawyers,' it would seriously strain this reasoning to sustain restric-
tions upon numerous positions that do not allow the employee suffi-
cient discretion to permit any significant manipulation to benefit the
organization. Nevertheless, the strained reasoning has been offered
in several arguments supporting the application of loyalty tests to all
government positions.
One such argument defends total coverage on the ground that it
1
62 See SEzmcic, Tam ORGAMZATIONAL WEAPON 215-24 (1960); BROww, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 215-18, 336-38. A special danger frequently mentioned in connec-
tion with employment of Communist party members is their tendency "to influence
specific [policy] decisions, especially on matters of less than central interest to the
target government which may help a communist faction abroad or may increase
vulnerability to Soviet diplomacy." SELzNicK, at 220. This possibility presents bas-
ically the same type of problems in devising an appropriate scope for loyalty oath
requirements as the tvo types of misuse of position mentioned in the text.
163 SELZNCIC, op. cit. supra note 162, at 222, citing statements by former Senator
R. M. La Follette, Jr., concerning the activities of "pro-communist elements" on the
staffs of congressional committees.
164 N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 360 (legislative findings supporting the Feinberg Law).
See also HooK, HERESY YEs-CoNsPmACY No 184-87 (1953); THOMAS, Tbn TEST oF
FREEDOM 90-93 (1954).
105 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 489-93 (1951). See also Beilan v.
Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
166 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). Although the primary issue before
the Court in the second Konigsberg case concerned the state's power to compel a
bar applicant to answer an inquiry concerning membership in the Communist party,
the Court did indicate that the standard for disqualification to which the inquiry
related-advocacy of violent overthrow-was constitutionally valid. See id. at 51-
52: "It would indeed be difficult to argue that a belief firm enough to be carried into
advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form of the State or Federal
government is an unimportant consideration in determining the fitness of applicants
for membership in a profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of
this country's legal and political institutions."
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is not administratively feasible to identify those positions in which
the opportunity for misuse of office in favor of organizational objec-
tives is either nonexistent or negligible.167 This is a difficult position
to sustain in the light of the ability of the federal government, for
example, to distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive positions
under the employee security program and between discretionary
and ministerial functions under the Federal Torts Claims Act.1 8
Also, it seems particularly unlikely to appeal to a Court that itself,
has undertaken the task of distinguishing between different stat6
positions in order to determine which persons are "public officials"
for the purpose of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule.00
Another argument favoring total coverage rests on the thesis that
the employment of members of groups advocating overthrow, no
matter what the individual's position, will give the government
service a bad public image and therefore impair its general effective-
ness. Assuming that such public reaction is a reality,70 decisions like
Wieman v. Updegraff'71 would seem to foreclose its use for impos-
ing a restriction upon constitutionally protected association. Al-
though Wieman deals with the member of an organization who is
unaware of its illegal objectives and Elfbrandt with the knowing
member who merely does not support those objectives, the differ-
ence in the two is unlikely to be significant insofar as public reaction
to employment of such persons is concerned. Except in unusual
cases, the member's lack of awareness of the organization's objec-
tives is unlikely to be a matter of public knowledge, and where it is,
it will often be disbelieved. Similarly, although Wieman, unlike
167 Cf. Brief for Respondent, pp. 36-43, 56-60; Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 US. 716 (1951).
108 See Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Dalehite v. United States, 346 US. 15
(1953). This is not to say that either of these distinctions is satisfactory for deter-
mining which positions might easily be misused to support organizational objec-
tives, but only to suggest that the process of classifying government jobs for this
purpose is no more difficult than drawing the distinctions required under the Fed-
eral Security program or the Federal Torts Claim Act.
169 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
170 See STouFFmi, CoMMuNISM, CoNroRMrrY AND CimL LmEamrs 39-45 (1955).
17' 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
172 See generally Mowitz, Michigan-State and Local Attack on Subversion, in
THF STATES AND SuavasloN 184, 206-15, 228-30 (1952) (Gellhorn ed.); Srourmn,
op. cit. supra note 170, at 39.
[1966
HeinOnline  -- 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 230 1966
ELFBRANDT V. RUSSELL 231
Elfbrandt, concerned membership in "front" organizations as well
as those directly advocating overthrow, the Court has clearly indi-
cated that the ruling there is applicable to members of either type of
organizationY.1 The negative impact upon free association is, of
course, presumably less in Elfbrandt than in Wieman because the
Arizona statute does include the element of "scienter." Yet this dif-
ference hardly seems likely to alter what might well be viewed in
Wieman as a total rejection of public reaction as a factor that may
be used in determining employment qualifications. 174 Adverse public
reaction may justify otherwise irrational government action in other
areas,176 but the Court is not willing to give such reaction any
weight where it would affect the exercise of a constitutionally pro-
tected right. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in his separate opin-
ion in Garner:176 "[Slurely a government could not exclude from
public employment members of a minority group merely because
they are odious to the majority." This seems equally true whether
the minority is defined in terms of race, religion, or politics.
Finally, the Court in Garner sustained the total coverage of a
loyalty oath requirement on the ground that membership in a group
such as the Communist party might be viewed as likely to affect the
individual's performance in all government positions, "both high
and low."'1 77 Unfortunately, the Court's opinion concentrated pri-
marily on other issues and offered little explanation of its conclu-
sion on this point.17 8 The opinion does suggest that the Court viewed
173 See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510 (1964); Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957); see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 247-48 (1957).
174 344 U.S. at 190-91; see also id. at 194-97 (concurring opinion). Although the
Court did not specifically mention the possible impact upon the public image of
government service, the opinion clearly recognized the community attitude about
persons discharged on loyalty grounds and emphasized that there was no state
interest that justified imposing that burden on the "innocent" member. Id. at 191.
175 Cf. NEwswxN , supra note 2 (improper sexual activities); Scott v. Macy, 349
F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
176 341 US. at 724. 177 Id. at 720.
178 The Court devoted only two paragraphs to this issue, the first dealing primarily
with the state's power to require that employees disclose by affidavit any past mem-
bership in the Communist party: 'We think that a municipal employer is not dis-
abled because it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its employees as to
matters that may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public serv-
ice. Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may have a rea-
sonable relationship to present and future trust. Both are commonly inquired into
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the individual's willingness to support illegal overthrow of the gov-
ernment as a reasonable indication of a general lack of "integrity."
It also has been suggested that members of such organizations tend
to be inefficient and easily disgruntled employees because of their
strong opposition to the government for which they work.17 0 Addi-
tionally, their intense psychological involvement in the organiza-
tion's "cause" allegedly makes them less able to devote their full
efforts to their work. 8 0 All these points have relevance, however,
only to the person who is deeply involved with the organization's
purpose. Although there are obviously some hard core members
("cadres") of whom it may be true,""' certainly membership with
knowledge of the organization's illegal purpose would hardly indi-
cate in itself that the individual falls in that category.'8 2 According-
ly, even if the Court gave full recognition to this argument, it could
still reject a loyalty requirement applicable to all knowing members
of an organization advocating overthrow irrespective of their pur-
pose in joining the organization or their degree of participation in
the organization's activities.8 3
in determining fitness for both high and low positions in private industry and are
not less relevant in public employment. The affidavit requirement is valid.
"2. In our view the validity of the oath turns upon the nature of the Charter
amendment (1941) and the relation of the ordinance (1948) to this amendment....
We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter amendment is valid
to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequent
to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or teach the violent overthrow of the
Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provi-
sions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the
municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the
State and the United States. Cf. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341
U.S. 56 (1951). Likewise, as a regulation of political activity of municipal employees,
the amendment was reasonably designed to protect the integrity and competency
of the service. This Court has held that Congress may reasonably restrict the politi-
cal activity of federal civil service employees for such a purpose, United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102-103 (1947), and a State is not without power
to do as much." 341 U.S. at 720-21.
1
7
9 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 336-37; ALMOND, Tib APPEA.s OF ComXmism
103, 260-62 (1954).
180 BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 337; ALMOND, op. cit. supra note 179, at 258-59.
181 MEYER, TnE MouLDiNG OF Commrmsrs 132-52, 161-65 (1961); ALMOND, Op.
cit. supra note 179, at 232-33.
182 SELNzMc, op. cit. supra note 162, at 83-85; MEYER, op. cit. supra note 181, at
105-31.
188 In Garner, the total coverage of the Los Angeles oath was emphasized only in
the ACLU brief as amicus curiae, p. 8. Respondent's reply simply brushed over
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The Court's rejection of the state's interest in insuring employee
fitness thus could have been based, in large part, upon the total
coverage of the Arizona oath. Yet, although Mr. Justice Douglas
does not in any sense reject this as the ground for decision, it seems
likely that the Elfbrandt decision was intended to have a much
greater reach. While the opinion does note that the Arizona statute
applies to all employees, it places no emphasis on this factor.18 4
On the other hand, the point on which Mr. Justice Douglas placed
the greatest stress, the denial of employment to members lacking
"specific intent," would seem to have significance no matter what
the coverage of the statute. Thus, although it is far from clear, the
opinion indicates that the Court would have reached the same con-
clusion had the Arizona oath been limited to employees, such as
teachers, whose jobs were clearly capable of being manipulated to
serve the interests of an organization advocating violent overthrow.
If that is true, the Court's ruling is of considerably more significance,
from a doctrinal as well as a practical viewpoint.
On a test oath limited to employees with discretionary authority,
the state's argument for the exclusion of all knowing members of an
organization advocating violent overthrow would rest essentially on
the recognized tendency of these organizations to "promote" the
"misuse" of such authority. As the Court at one time recognized in
a related context, even members of such organizations who have no
interest in promoting the overthrow of the government may be in-
duced to misuse public power to achieve organizational objectives.8 5
Thus, it has been suggested that teachers belonging to the Com-
munist party will use their classes to advance the party line, not be-
cause they necessarily believe in overthrow, but because they be-
this objection as an administrative matter on which the state's judgment must be
respected. Respondents brief, p. 66. Other than this the briefs concentrated almost
entirely on the bill of attainder argument. Very little attention was given to the
membership clause, and there was no mention of the absence of a requirement of
specific intent to support the organization's illegal objective.
184 384 U.S. at 12. The Court mentioned the total coverage only in the general
description of the facts of the case.
185 See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 387-89 (1950).
The Taft-Hartley provision sustained in Douds extended to all members of the
Communist party, irrespective of the individual's attitude toward its illegal objec-
tives. Of course, Douds has been undercut to a great extent by United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), and though Brown rejects the Douds analysis pri-
marily on other points, the opinion there suggests that the Court also would reject
this aspect of the Douds reasoning. See id. at 455-56.
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lieve in the legal objectives of the party and because the party strong-
ly urges its members to engage in this activity as a means of achiev-
ing those objectives.'8" The statute in Elfbrandt was not, of course,
limited in application to the Communist party, but the manipula-
tion of public offices in the manner previously described would be
an essential ingredient of the program of any organization that
hoped to overthrow the government. In sum, the argument would
be that even members who do not subscribe to the organization's
illegal ends pose a danger because (1) the organization imposes
great pressure on its members to build group strength through the
employee's manipulation of discretionary authority, and (2) the
nature of the manipulation is sufficiently related to the group's
legal objectives to encourage participation by members who favor
only those objectives. The first factor, the constant stress on ma-
nipulation, also serves to distinguish the state's regulation here from
the possibly unconstitutional denial of employment to members
of other groups that might profit by manipulation of public power.
Thus, it provides the answer to the argument that the exclusion of
Communist teachers logically would also permit the exclusion of
Catholic clergy teaching in public schools because they too en-
gaged in classroom indoctrination. 87 Although members of some
other groups may occasionally misuse their public position to aid
the group, only organizations advocating overthrow have actively
promoted such activity, as logically they must if they are to achieve
their basic goal.188
The opinion in Elfbrandt does not clearly indicate whether the
Court considered this argument or, if so, on what grounds it rejected
it. Certainly, the majority's reliance on the prohibition against
"guilt by association" would not be an adequate ground. The denial
of employment to all knowing members does not rest on a "con-
clusive presumption that the member shares the unlawful aims of
the organization,"'189 but rather on the potential danger presented
186 See generally HooK, op. cit. supra note 164, at 181-86; BROWN, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 340-41.
187 See Zeller v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (NM. 1951); see also HooK, op. cit. supra
note 164, at 219-20.
188 HooK, op. cit. supra note 164, at 219-20; see also SaMzxciK, op. cit. supra note
162, at 221-24.
189 384 U.S. at 17.
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by the member even when he does not share these aims. In fact,
the Court's reliance on this argument might well indicate that it
did not appreciate the state's position in this regard.
On the other hand, the Court relied heavily on Aptheker v.
Secretary of State,190 which does provide an adequate basis for re-
jecting the state's argument. In Aptheker the Court held unconsti-
tutional a section of the Securities Activities Control Act that made
it a crime for any member of an organization found to be a "com-
munist organization" to seek a United States passport.19' The con-
gressional purpose in enacting this provision had been to prevent
travel abroad that could further the organization's relationship with
the "world Communist movement" through the exchange of secret
communiques, the training of local leaders, and similar activities.
19 2
The Court majority there, including four members of the Elfbrandt
majority, 1 3 held the statute unconstitutional because, as in Elf-
brandt, the legislature had sought to achieve its objective "by means
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedom."' 4 The unnecessary breadth came from Con-
gress' failure to take into consideration several factors that were
considered relevant to "the likelihood that travel by such a person
would be attended by the type of activity which Congress sought
to control."'915 The Court particularly emphasized that the statute
automatically denied the member's right to travel without regard
to his knowledge of the organization's improper purpose, "his com-
mitment to its purpose," "his degree of activity in the organization,"
his "purposes" for wishing to travel, and "the security-sensitivity
of the areas in which he wishes to travel."'196
Despite certain differences, a strong analogy can be drawn be-
tween Aptheker and Elfbrandt. Although the holding in Aptheker
was framed in terms of the Fifth Amendment right to travel,97
various references in the opinion indicate that the decision was
100 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
10164 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
192 378 US. at 526-27 (dissenting opinion).
103 The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. Mr. Justice
Fortas, the fifth member of the Elfbrandt majority, was not then a member of the
Court.
104 378 US. at 508, quoting from N.A.A.C .P. v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
'Or 378 U.S, at 510. 1968 d. at 510, 512. 197 Id. at 505-07, 514, 517.
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grounded on the restriction upon free association. The Court relied
in large part on First Amendment cases, 98 and specifically analo-
gized the restrictions on the issuance of passports to loyalty restric-
tions on government employment. 99 Also, although the legislation
extended to "Communist front" organizations and therefore in-
cluded groups in which a large majority of members were unlikely
to be aligned with the "world Communist movement," 200 the
Court's opinion did not refer to this fact, and it made no effort to
distinguish between members of "Communist front" and "Com-
munist action" organizations. Thus, despite Mr. Justice White's
objection that "Aptheker did not deal with the government em-
ployee," 20'- the ruling in Aptheker clearly was entitled to significant
consideration in determining the validity of an employment test
imposing a similar type of restriction upon the individual's right of
association.
Mr. Justice White also distinguished Aptheker on the ground
that the statute involved there applied to members who were un-
aware of the organization's ties to the "world Communist move-
ment." 202 The Aptheker opinion indicates, however, that the addi-
tion of this element of knowledge would not have altered the result
in that case. The opinion placed great stress on the legislature's
failure to consider the individual's "activity, commitment, and pur-
pose in the places for travel." 2 3 Perhaps, the Court's reliance upon
one of these factors, the member's commitment to the organization's
purposes, could be distinguished in the situation presented by Elf-
brandt. Unlike the prospect of manipulation of public office, the
activities that Congress sought to inhibit in the passport legislation
198 See, e.g., id. at 517, 525; see also Note, 78 HAuv. L. REv. 143, 195-99 (1964).
199 378 U.S. at 508, 510, 513-14.
200 Communist front organizations are those (1) "substantially directed, domi-
nated, or controlled by a Communist action organization," and (2) "primarily
operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Communist-action organ-
ization ... or the world Communist movement." 64 Stat. 989, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1964).
See American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born v. SA.C3.,
331 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1962), vacated, 380 U.S. 503, 505 (1965).
201384 U.S. at 22. 202 Ibid.
203 Id. at 514. "In addition to the absence of criteria linking the bare fact of
membership to the individual's knowledge, activity or commitment, § 6 also excludes
other considerations which might more closely relate the denial of passports to the
stated purpose of the legislation." Id. at 511.
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would be undertaken only by members who shared the organiza-
don's goal of promoting the "world Communist movement." But
the stress that Aptheker places on the other factors of activity and
purpose of travel, especially when viewed in the light of the ad-
ministrative burdens involved in considering those factors,204 sug-
gests a general policy, equally applicable to Elfbrandt, against the
use of knowing membership as an indicator of an individual's tend-
ency to act improperly on behalf of an organization. Surely, if this
policy required legislative consideration of so many factors beyond
the element of scienter in Aptheker, it could easily make similar
demands of Arizona.
Reliance upon Aptheker becomes more difficult, however, if
Elfbrandt is viewed as establishing a standard that would be ap-
plicable to a loyalty oath requirement limited to employees with
discretionary authority. Although the Aptheker Court stated that
several factors were relevant to the congressional purpose in re-
stricting travel, it did not state that a legislative standard neces-
sarily must include every one of these factors. In fact, it clearly
avoided this conclusion when it stated that there was no need to
consider the constitutionality of the passport regulation as applied
to the petitioners-both very active high officials of the party-be-
cause the petitioners could, in any event, attack the legislation on its
face.205 Certainly the opinion left open the possibility that Congress
might condition the issuance of passports on most of the factors
mentioned, yet exclude others as not equally significant. Thus,
204 The Court did not mention the obvious administrative difficulties involved
in considering all of these factors. The reference to the federal employees loyalty
program, however, apparently constituted its answer to this problem. Whether
the problems could be handled by an administrative program is uncertain. Could
an administrative hearing determine, for example, whether Aptheker's purpose was
merely to travel and lecture abroad, to visit the Bodleian library, etc.? In any event,
the increase in administrative burden would obviously be great. But this factor
was not considered worthy of discussion.
20r See, e.g., 378 U.S. at 514-17. One of the major questions presented in Aptheker
was whether the Court should consider the lack of statutory recognition of such
elements as scienter and active membership when the petitioners themselves clear-
ly met those requirements. This question would have been irrelevant if, for example,
the "purposes and places of travel" were factors that the legislature had to take
into consideration. If that were the case, the statute would clearly be unconstitutional
even as it related to the petitioners. The Court, however, did not rule on the statute
as it applied to the active member, but held that the petitioners had standing to
attack the validity of the statute "on its face." Id. at 515.
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it might provide that all knowing members of "communist organi-
zations," would be denied passports to visit the U.S.S.R. or the
"satellite" countries except in connection with very limited pur-
poses. Whether the Court would reject this provision because
it was not also limited to active members committed to the organi-
zation's illicit purposes is not settled by Aptheker. The validity of
a loyalty oath based on knowing membership, but limited in ap-
plication to a specific group, such as teachers, would present a
roughly similar question. If Elfbrandt was intended to control in
this situation, then it clearly has proceeded, albeit without discus-
sion, beyond the position taken in Aptheker. This is not to sug-
gest that the general tenor of the opinion in Aptheker might not
furnish some support for such an extension. Certainly the basic
thrust of Mr. Justice Goldberg's opinion in Aptheker might be
viewed as indicating that legislation characterizing individuals ac-
cording to membership will be accepted only when the class of
members is so sharply limited by consideration of all relevant facts
that the tendency ascribed to the group is shown to be an almost
uniform characteristic of each member. 0 Under this premise, of
course, Elfbrandt's requirement of "specific intent" is easily sus-
tainable without regard to the limited nature of the positions cov-
ered by the oath requirement.
This view of Aptheker would also lend support to the suggestion
in Elfbrandt that an appropriate loyalty oath would require that the
excluded individual be an "active" member of the organization.
Requiring this additional element would mean, in effect, that the
constitutional limits imposed upon an indirect restraint aimed at
preventing improper manipulation of public office would be identi-
cal, in the end, with the constitutional limits presently imposed
under Scales on direct restraints on association. °7 Actually, as pre-
viously noted, the Elfbrandt opinion at one point suggests that the
constitutional restrictions on the loyalty oath standard might be
taken one step further to require membership with "specific intent"
206 Acceptance of this view of Aptheker might place the legislature on the horns
of a dilemma, since legislation limited to such a specific class could present diffi-
culties under the newly expanded concept of "bills of attainder" as presented in
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). See also note 58 supra.
207 See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Noto v. United States,
267 U.S. 290 (1961).
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plus past participation in the organization's unlawful activities. This
proposal reflects the views of Justices Black and Douglas that
"government can concern itself only with the actions of men, not
with their opinions or beliefs. '20 If this position were applied
literally to government employment, the Court would probably
be forced to overrule all the cases cited in the Elfbrandt dissent,
including the Gerende decision in which Justices Black and Doug-
las joined.209 Moreover, the standard suggested would obviously
extend beyond the security area and raise a serious question of the
validity of common employment criteria, e.g., personality profiles
that are based in large part upon the individual's general attitudes
and viewpoints.210 It seems unlikely that the single reference in
Elfbrandt to the individual's past participation in illegal action
reflected the willingness of the majority as a whole to take this
step. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, in particular,
have carefully avoided joining those Black and Douglas dissents
that suggest such a position.211 The reference in Elfbrandt may
reflect a possible change of heart on their part, but similar language
found in Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Schware turned out to have
212little consequence.
2 0 8 Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 412, 415 (1958) (Black and Doug-
las, JJ., dissenting); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 535-36 (1958) (same).
But of. DoUGLAs, op. cit. supra note 89, at 118-19.
Justices Douglas and Black have on several occasions argued that participation
in the organization's illegal activities should be a prerequisite for employment dis-
qualification. See, e.g., Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 258 (1961); Beilan
v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. at 412-16; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. at
511. Mr. Justice Douglas also has suggested that such activity is a constitutional
prerequisite for the deportation of aliens. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 568-
69 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
209 But see DouGLAs, op. cit. supra note 89, at 130.
21oSee generally, Mirel, The Limits of Governmental Inquiry into the Private
Lives of Government Employees, 46 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1966); Creech, Psychological
Testing and Constitutional Rights, [1966] Durr L.J. 332.
211 See, e.g., Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 411, 417 (1958) (dis-
senting opinions); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Mr. Justice Brennan has
been particularly consistent in this regard. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 80 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 429 (1961); Braden
v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 446 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
166 (1959).
212 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 245-46 (1957); Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 267 (1957).
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VII. THE STATE'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING INTERNAL SECURITY
The Court's ruling in Elfbrandt also constituted a rejection
of the state's interest in preserving internal security as a justification
for the Arizona oath. The problems presented by this aspect of the
Court's decision are basically the same as those discussed in con-
nection with the rejection of the state interest in insuring employee
reliability. Here also, the significance of the decision depends in
large part on how the Court viewed the state's interest as presented
in Elfbrandt.
The Court has asserted that the state's interest in guarding against
acts injurious to internal security, such as sabotage, espionage, or
the unintentional release of confidential information, will be given
substantial weight in justifying indirect restrictions upon speech.
213
The difficulty in Elfbrandt, once again, was that Arizona's oath
requirement applied to all state employees. The decision in Cole v.
Young,2 14 although not based on constitutional grounds, certainly
indicates that little, if any, weight will be given to the state's alleged
interest in preserving internal security where no effort has been
made to separate the sensitive from the non-sensitive position. The
Court in Cole held that a federal statute authorizing summary dis-
charge of employees "in the interest of national security 21r could
not properly be applied to all government positions. The dissent
had argued that total coverage was necessary because "one never
knows just which job is sensitive."2 16 The majority concluded,
however, that the task of distinguishing between jobs on the basis
of task, access to information, and similar factors was not so diffi-
cult as to suppose that Congress meant to include all federal posi-
tions under an extraordinary procedure that denied the employee
the normal safeguards of civil service procedures. Certainly, with
First Amendment rights involved, the Court would expect the states
to be equally capable of distinguishing between positions. Accord-
ingly, insofar as the state's interest in protecting against subversion
is concerned, a loyalty restriction encompassing all state employees
might easily be characterized as using "means that broadly stifle
213 See, e.g., Communist Party v. SA.CB., 367 U.S. 1, 93-96 (1961); Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127-29 (1959).
214 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
215 64 Star. 476, 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1964). 216 351 U.S. at 569.
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fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved."
As previously noted, however, there is little to indicate that the
Court in fact based its decision on the total coverage of the Arizona
oath requirement. On the other hand, as Mr. Justice White empha-
sized in his dissent, the majority opinion nowhere "expressly holds
that a state must retain, even in its most sensitive positions, those
who lend such support as knowing membership entails to those
organizations, such as the Communist party, whose purposes in-
clude the violent destruction of democratic government." 217 The
nature of the test oath is such, however, that it is unlikely to be
used as a primary security device for the "most sensitive position,"
nor, for that matter, is the state government likely to have many
such positions.21 s Nevertheless, a loyalty requirement of the type
employed in Elfbrandt might well be imposed for a limited group
of persons, such as state civil defense workers, police officers, and
others who would occupy particularly important positions in time
of emergency.219 As limited to such positions, a state could defend
a standard excluding all knowing members of organizations urging
violent overthrow on at least two grounds that have considerable
support in practice under state and federal security programs.
First, the state might argue that the importance of its interest in
safeguarding against potential subversion justifies exclusion of all
knowing members as the most effective administrative means of
insuring complete exclusion of these knowing members who do
217 384 U.S. at 20.
218 Loyalty oaths are usually required of general classes of employees, e.g.,
all teachers and civil defense workers. Those state employees who have access to
classified information will usually constitute only a small group of upper-level
officials within a department, e.g., senior officers within the state militia. These
people will often be subject to federal clearance, and the state is unlikely to
single them out as the subjects for a special loyalty oath.
219 See generally BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 92-109, 235-53, 470-71. Various
states presently require civil defense workers to take an oath patterned after the
federal civil defense oath. 64 Stat. 1256, 50 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). See, e.g., CoNN.
REv. STAT. § 28-12 (1965 Supp.); ILL. AN. ST., ch. 127, § 286 (1966 Supp.); Miss REv.
STAT. 38610-18 (1964). A 1965 compilation of state statutes listed thirty states
with special civil defense oaths. FuND FOR THm REPUBLIc, DiG sT OF THE PUBLIc
REcORD OF CoMmuNism 347-82 (1955). Although these oaths vary in context, they
all require a denial of membership in any group that advocates the overthrow of the
government.
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share the organization's illegal objectives2 0 The effectiveness of a
provision like § 5 of the Arizona statute depends upon the deter-
rence potential of possible criminal prosecution for improperly
subscribing to the state loyalty oath. Yet, while most knowing
members arguably do support the organization's illegal objectives,
proof of "specific intent" as it relates to a particular individual may
often be very difficult. 221 Accordingly, to make the loyalty require-
ment an effective device, the state must be given administrative
leeway to encompass an area of membership somewhat larger than
that which is the direct source of the supposed evil. Admittedly,
administrative leeway of this sort is not ordinarily accorded in areas
affecting free association, but here, where the statute is appropri-
ately limited to sensitive positions, the impact of the restriction on
association is also limited and the state's need is greater. Any indi-
cation in previous cases that only knowing members may be auto-
matically excluded even from sensitive positions in no way consti-
tutes a rejection of this position.222 Failure to require that the mem-
ber at least be aware of the organization's illegal goals would vastly
increase the area of associational freedom that would be subject
to restraint. Moreover, the element of knowledge, so the argument
goes, is not nearly so difficult to prove as that of specific intent to
further the organization's illegal purposes. m
The state may also argue that the exclusion of all knowing mem-
bers is justified because even the knowing member who does not
share the organization's objective of violent overthrow may present
a threat to internal security. As the Court has recognized on several
occasions, security requirements for sensitive positions extend far
beyond the individual's loyalty to his government.224 A person who
does not favor violent overthrow of the government but neverthe-
less joins an organization supporting that objective, either does not
220 See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 235-43, 265.
221 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
222 E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). Wieman, of course, involved
an oath required of all state employees and could be distinguished on that ground.
See Willcox, supra note 129, at 12, 50 n. 158.
223See Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 244-58 (1961). See also HooK,
op. cit. supra note 164, at 89; GarnsoaR, INwmuArL FREEDoM AN GovEitNmNT RE-
srLuTs 135 (1956).
224 See, e.g., Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 US. 886, 898-99
(1961); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468,478 (1958); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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consider that organization a serious threat or considers the achieve-
ment of other values more important than possibly increasing the
risk of overthrow. In either case, the individual indicates a lack of
appropriate concern for security measures.225 Similarly, it might
also be argued that anyone who associates with potential subversives
necessarily puts himself in a position where he becomes a more
likely subject of coercive pressure to join a subversive activity.226
While both these arguments have an Orwellian air about them, the
state could cite experience under the federal loyal security program
to support their use in the case of employees who occupy sensitive
jobs. 22
Assuming the Court in Elfbrandt meant to reject all arguments
of this type, the basis for its conclusion, at least as indicated by the
majority opinion, again would rest primarily on Aptheker. The
Aptheker decision seems to be relevant here in much the same
sense as it would be in the situation where the state seeks to insure
against possible misuse of public office by excluding knowing mem-
bers from positions carrying considerable discretionary authority.22
The difference in the nature of the interest in safeguarding against
subversion is not likely to be controlling. Aptheker, after all, was
itself presented to the Court as a case involving national security.229
An argument could be made that the state's security interest is so
greatly sharpened when only sensitive positions are involved that
a policy announced in connection with the general restriction on
travel voided in Aptheker, even if equally applicable to more lim-
ited restrictions concerning other state interests, would not be
applicable here. Both past decisions and Elfbrandt itself suggest,
however, that the Elfbrandt majority would not be receptive to
such an argument, if for no other reason than that they would
refuse to attach any special significance to the state interest in safe-
guarding against subversion by such groups as the police or civil
defense workers.
The Chief Justice, and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan
2 2 5 Cf. ATOIC ENERGY CoMMIssIoN, IN THE MATtER Or J. ROBERT OPPENHmiM
(1954). See Hoor, op. cit. supra note 164, at 225.
2 26 See BROWN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 254-61, 272; SFIZMcK, op. cit. supra
note 162, at 70-72.
227 See BRowN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 37, 254-79.
228 See text at notes 204-07 supra. 229 378 U.S. at 509.
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all have indicated that they draw an important distinction between
government positions classified as "sensitive" because of special ac-
cess to confidential information and those placed in that category
simply because of their potential significance during a period of
national emergency. In fact, for Justices Black and Douglas, the
state's interest in protecting against subversion by employees in
the latter situation will rank no higher than its interest generally
in preventing other types of misuse of position. Thus, in Lerner v.
Casey,23° Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
clearly gave no special weight to the fact that the employee, a New
York subway conductor, was classified as working in a "sensitive"
position under the New York Risk Law. Mr. Justice Douglas
treated the question of the state's power to discharge the conductor
on the basis of his speech or association as no different from its
power to discharge the teacher involved in a companion case from
Pennsylvania.231 In response to the state's argument that the con-
ductor's access to an important transportation facility placed him
in an especially sensitive position, Mr. Justice Douglas quoted a
lower court opinion noting that vast numbers of persons through-
out the economy had access to prime sites for sabotage, that the
imposition of restrictive security regulations on all such persons
would be constitutionally impermissible, and therefore "in the event
of war" we may just have to take our chances with the possibility
of "Black Tom explosions on every waterfront, poison in our water
systems, and sand in all important industrial machines." 232 Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas has recognized, on the other hand, that special consid-
erations may require more flexibility in permitting the discharge of
persons who have access to classified information or restricted
locations. 33 Mr. Justice Brennan, along with the Chief Justice, also
230 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
231 357 U.S. at 415-16.
232Id. at 416-17, quoting Judge Pope in Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 721
(9th Cir. 1955). See also Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 300, 303-04
(1956) (dissenting opinion).
233 See DouG_.As, THE RIGHT To BE LET ALONE 118, 121 (1958). Although recog-
nizing the importance of the security interest in this situation, Mr. Justice Douglas
still opposes any type of administrative program that might involve "labeling."
He would prefer that the executive in charge have absolute discretion to discharge
men and women in "sensitive jobs for good reasons or for no reasons at all"
Id. at 121. Exactly what would happen to the normal civil service protection
of employees in this category is not stated, but the loss of that safeguard is appar-
ently deemed to be the lesser of two evils.
[1966
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has recognized this distinction, although it is not clear that they
would go quite so far as Mr. Justice Douglas in their treatment of
the fact that a particular government position provides the poten-
tial to cause substantial harm in an emergency situation. 34 While
the remainder of the Court has not spoken to this point, it seems
likely that at least Mr. Justice Fortas, who was in the majority in
Elfbrandt, would also be reluctant to attach any substantial weight
to the state's interest in preventing subversion as it related to jobs
with particular security significance only under the "remote risk
of a mass breakdown. 23 5
VIII. Tim PRAcicAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ELFBRANDT AND THE
FuTuRE OF LoYALTY OATHS
In terms of the legal limits upon loyalty oaths, the ultimate
significance of Elfbrandt will depend upon how the Court answers
various questions left unanswered by Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion:
whether the Garner case has been overruled; whether the Court
has rejected the state's interest in denying support to "disloyal"
persons as an appropriate basis for a test oath; whether the addition
of an element of "specific intent to further the illegal aims of the
organization" would be required in an oath limited in application
to employees in positions that could easily be manipulated to serve
organizational ends; whether the same would be true of an oath
applicable only to employees in positions classified as "sensitive"
from the standpoint of protecting internal security; and, finally,
whether, wherever the specific intent element must be added, the
Court will also insist upon a requirement of active participation in
the organization's affairs, or even participation in illegal activities.
On the other hand, in terms of its practical significance, the impact
of Elfbrandt will be much the same whether these questions are
answered in one way or in another.
Obviously, many oaths, no matter what view of Elfbrandt is
taken, will survive litigation, at least temporarily. State courts,
taking a page from the Scales case,236 may "read into" the mem-
234 Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 417, 421-22 (1958).
23 5 BRowN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 248.
230 367 U.S. 203 (1961). The Court there interpreted the Smith Act membership
clause to require both "active" membership and "specific intent" to support vio-
lent overthrow, although neither element was mentioned in the statute. State courts
have followed this pattern in the past with respect to the element of scienter.
See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 US. 485, 494 n. 8 (1952).
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bership clause of state oaths the requirements of specific intent
and perhaps even active membership. In other instances, while the
membership clause may be held unconstitutional, the state court
will retain as properly severable that clause dealing with the indi-
vidual's own advocacy of overthrow. 23 7 Even where the entire oath
is voided, the likelihood is that the legislature will swiftly re-enact
it in appropriately modified form. For the combination of cold
war exasperation, fear, and chauvinism that produces community
support for loyalty tests apparently is still present in most parts
of the country. While Congress was repealing the loyalty affidavit
requirements of the Defense Education Act and Economic Oppor-
tunity Act,2 38 it was adopting a new loyalty requirement in the
Medicare Act,23 9 and the Office of Economic Opportunity was
adding still another loyalty requirement for antipoverty workers.240
Similarly, on the state level, organized efforts to gain legislative
repeal of oaths have been noticeably unsuccessful.241
It is equally clear that the ardent opposition to the oaths will be
only slightly mollified, if at all, by the addition to the oaths of such
requirements as the member's "specific intent" to support the or-
ganization's illegal objectives. In the past that opposition has gone
primarily to the basic concept of the loyalty oath, rather than to
the specific standards employed in the oaths.242 Resentment of indi-
viduals at being singled out as government employees or teachers
to swear to such oaths will remain.243 As for those employees whose
associations might have been determined in part by the fear of a
possible prosecution or loss of job, the addition of the elements of
"specific intent" and "active membership" is unlikely to provide
great comfort-especially when the Court itself warns that both
prosecutors and juries are only "human" and may therefore have a
237 Cf. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 137 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1962).
238 76 Stat. 1070 (1962); 79 Stat. 973 (1961). See N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1962, p. 13,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1962, p. 1, col. 2.
239 79 Stat. 333, 42 U.S.C. § 427 (note). See note 160 supra. This requirement has
been implemented by the use of an oath.
240 ACLU, Feature Press Service Bulletin, § 2265, May 9, 1966.
241 See note 4 supra.
242 See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. PA. L. RFv. 480,
486 (1953).
243 See N.Y. Times, March 11, 1966, p. 9, cols. 3, 4.
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tendency to "label as Communist [any] ideas which they oppose." 244
In light of these facts, it is not surprising that current legal at-
tacks against loyalty oaths frequently are concentrated not on
standards used in the oaths, but on the alleged invalidity of any
and all loyalty oaths, no matter what standards they employ.245
The main argument being advanced is that, assuming the state may
utilize some form of loyalty test based upon certain classes of speech
and association to serve the legitimate interests of protecting internal
security and insuring employee reliability, the loyalty oath is in-
valid because it is a totally inappropriate means of serving those
interests. Thus, the petitioner in Elfbrandt based his argument in
part on the alleged ineffectiveness of loyalty oaths in keeping un-
desirable persons out of government employment.246 In support of
this position, petitioner cited several commentators who have noted
that oaths have been most ineffective in disclosing potential sub-
versives.247 The only employees who have objected to newly im-
posed oaths have been those with conscientious objections to the
oath. On the other hand, "the really dangerous 'Reds,' the un-
identified plotters, are unlikely to stickle at taking the oaths. 248
Mr. Justice Douglas took a similar extrajudicial view of the loy-
alty oath.249 And the Elfbrandt opinion quotes an Arizona legis-
lative report that notes the ineffectiveness of oaths against "the
Communist trained in fraud and perjury."2 50 The report appears
to have been used to make another point,25' however, and it seems
unlikely that the Court as a whole would be willing to base its
judgment in any large degree upon the alleged ineffectiveness of the
244 384 US. at 16-17. See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 509
(1952).
245 See note 4 supra. 246 Brief for Petitioner, 6, 27-28.
247 Id. at 28, citing Horowitz, supra note 93; Byse, supra note 242; Elson, People,
Govermnent and Security, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 83 (1956); O'Brian, New Encroach-
ments on Individual Freedom, 66 Htav. L. REv. 1 (1952).
248 Ga.ruow, op. cit. supra note 223, at 367-68, quoted in Byse, supra note 242,
at 485.
240 DouGrAs, op. cit., supra note 89, at 135-36.
20o 384 US. at 18, quoting from the report of the Arizona Judiciary Committee,
Journal of the Senate, 1st Reg. Sess., 25th Legislature of Arizona 424 (1961).
251 The remainder of the quotation dealt with the impact of the oath upon
public employees generally, and the report was cited to emphasize Mr. Justice
Douglas' argument on that point. See 384 U.S. at 17-18.
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oaths. Since the effectiveness of the oaths depends in large degree
upon the fear of a possible prosecution for false swearing,25 2 any
attempt to evaluate its operation is necessarily speculative. Individ-
uals who openly refuse to take the oath afford no basis for judg-
ment.23 The active member of an organization who might poten-
tially misuse his office or even engage in subversion to assist the
organization is not likely to announce that he is leaving govern-
ment employment because he fears a possible criminal prosecution
for false swearing. In the end, the effectiveness of the loyalty oath
in forcing such persons out of government remains in large part a
matter of conjecture.5 4
A more substantial argument supporting the rejection of all oaths
could be based on the rationale of Aptheker and Elfbrandt, that
the oath constitutes an unnecessarily restrictive means of accom-
plishing the state's objectives. First, it might be argued that the
only legitimate objective of a loyalty oath is the exclusion of per-
sons who might engage in undesirable conduct as an employee.
This would require that the Court expand upon the theme of
Speiser and find that the denial of employment for reasons unre-
lated to the employee's prospective performance in office consti-
tutes punishment and cannot be imposed without the procedural
guarantees afforded by the Sixth Amendment.2Y5 With this point
established, it could be argued that the loyalty oath constituted an
unnecessarily broad and rigid means of judging the employee's po-
tential performance. The determination that an individual is likely
to misuse his public position in order to aid a subversive organization
or to engage in subversion cannot rest on the automatic application
of any set criterion. Several factors, it could be argued, must be
considered, and each is a variable that must be viewed in the light
of the others. Even, for example, the individual's commitment to
252 A substantial number of prosecutions for false swearing were brought on the
basis of the Taft-Hartley loyalty oath sustained in American Communications Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See 1 EMERSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTs IN ntm UNITE STATES 472 (1954). At least one criminal prosecution relating
back to the Taft-Hartley oath is still pending. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S.
855 (1966).
253 On the other hand, it is relevant in determining the impact of the restriction
on the free exercise of the right of association. See Byse, supra note 242, at 484-85.
254 See BRowN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 94-95.
255 See text at notes 138-52 supra.
[1966
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the illegal goals of an organization and his active membership in
the organization cannot be treated as sufficient. The state must also
examine the nature of the position involved, the employee's past
attitude toward his work, and the nature of the "subversive" organ-
ization to which he belongs. All of these are factors that must be
considered and weighed on an individual basis. The oath is not
sufficiently flexible to permit this and, as a result, may easily ex-
clude a person who, upon consideration of all the relevant factors,
would be found not to present a potential for either direct sub-
version or misuse of office. Accordingly, the argument would con-
clude, the loyalty oath constitutes a means of achieving a legitimate
state end that "broadly stifle[s] fundamental personal rights when
the end can be more narrowly achieved." 5"
Support for this argument could come from both Aptheker and
Elfbrandt in so far as both cases suggest that multiple factors must
be considered in administrating an employment standard related to
speech or association. Aptheker also lends some support for the
position that these factors cannot be weighted automatically by a
loyalty oath. In striking down a statutory prohibition against the
issuance of passports to members of "communist organizations,"
the Court in Aptheker specifically pointed to the Federal Employee
Loyalty program as an analogous illustration of a "less drastic"
means of achieving the congressional purpose of safeguarding na-
tional security.257 The same federal program illustrates that here also
the state's interests "can be adequately protected by means which,
when compared with [the loyalty oath] are more discriminately
tailored to the constitutional liberties of the individual. 258
Although this position may indeed find a fair degree of support
in Aptheker and Elfbrandt, its acceptance by the Court would be
most unfortunate. It would ignore the fact that the rule prohibiting
a state from using means that "broadly stifle fundamental rights
when the end can be more narrowly achieved" represents a judicial,
not a legislative, standard, and it is to be applied within the limits
of the judicial function in reviewing legislation. As noted by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter:
259
256 Shelton v. Tucker, 362 U.S. 479, 488 (1961).
257 358 US. at 512-14.
2 5
8 Id. at 514.
259 364 U.S. at 493-94.
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The consideration of feasible alternative modes of regulation
... [does] not imply that the Court might substitute its own
choice among alternatives for that of a state legislature or that
the states ... [are] to be restricted to the narrowest workable
means of accomplishing an end .... The issue remains whether,
in light of the particular kind of restriction upon individual
liberty which a regulation entails, it is reasonable for a legisla-
ture to choose that form of regulation rather than others less
restrictive. To that determination, the range of judgments eas-
ily open to a legislature in considering the relative degrees of
efficiency of alternative means in achieving the end it seeks is
pertinent.
The argument for total rejection of loyalty oaths simply fails to
give weight to these pertinent factors. To suggest that the loyalty
oath is unconstitutional because a loyalty program will provide less
rigid standards and, therefore, will reach more appropriate results
in an individual case is to ignore all considerations of cost, of ad-
ministrative ease,260 and perhaps even of the over-all impact on so-
ciety in its exercise of associational rights. For one can easily argue
that a loyalty program has a far greater restrictive impact on
speech than does the loyalty oath. Admittedly, the program offers
the individual a chance to explain his position, and therefore should
produce a decision in which the individual would have more con-
fidence. But loyalty programs also permit broad-ranging investiga-
tions of an individual's beliefs and background, involve considerably
more delay and expense to the individual, and offer far greater
opportunity for serious injury to his reputation. 61 In any event,
irrespective of which type of regulation in fact constitutes a more
serious deterrent to the exercise of individual rights, this hardly
seems to be the type of judgment that the Court can adequately or
appropriately make.
The relative merits or demerits of the loyalty oath and loyalty
program point up the practical limits of a decision that would go
so far as to find all loyalty oaths invalid. As noted, the public con-
cem over security and loyalty matters still runs strong. The rejec-
260 The costs of administration here are obviously far more substantial than in
Shelton. See KALvEN, Tim NEGRO Am THE Fmsr A~mNDmrEv 103-05 (1965). See also
Karst, supra note 125, at 15-18; BICKEL, THE LrAsT DANGERous BRANCH 113-17
(1962).
261See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 508 (1952) (dissenting
opinion); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540-45 (1959); BROWN, Op. cit. supra
note 5, at 21-61, 183-201, 235-83. But see Green, Q-Clearance: The Development
of a Personnel Security Program, 20 BuL.. AToMIc ScE -s-s 9 (1964).
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don of loyalty oaths might only produce a new series of loy-
alty programs. The Court has directly considered the constitu-
tionality of a loyalty program only in Adler,262 and even then it
scrutinized only a part of the program. Nevertheless, the nature of
the response by both majority and dissent to earlier cases involving
the federal program indicates that with appropriate procedure and
labels an administrative loyalty program limited in application to
special groups of employees will be sustained.6 Admittedly, admin-
istrative programs cost more to administer than loyalty oaths and
consequently will not be used as extensively.64 Yet it seems likely
also that loyalty programs will be used in connection with those
positions, such as public school teachers, where the programs can
do the greatest damage to the spirit of free inquiry. In the end,
looking to the impact on free association throughout the society,
one must wonder which is the lesser evil. It must be recognized,
however, that the loyalty oath and loyalty program can be, and
sometimes are, cumulative and not alternative devices. In this light,
a prohibition against oaths might well appeal to the Court as afford-
ing some diminution of the total restriction that may be imposed
upon speech by loyalty measures.
IX. CONCLUSION: TIE ELFBRANDT OPNIoN
At last, a few comments should be made concerning the
Elfbrandt opinion, not as it reflects upon the future of loyalty
oaths, but simply as it reflects on the art of opinion writing as prac-
ticed in the Supreme Court. If one were asked to pick that opinion
in the 1966 Term that best lends support to the recent criticism
of the Court's opinions, 265 there is no doubt that Elfbrandt would
262 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
208 See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 539
(1959); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). While Justices Black and Douglas have
not hesitated in other cases to go beyond the procedural issue presented and find the
entire state or federal program invalid, see, e.g., Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524,
568 (1952); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 512 (1958), they have not suggested here
that the entire federal program is invalid. Mr. Justice Brennan and the Chief Justice
clearly have been willing to assume that a program would be valid provided the
proper procedures were followed and employees were not categorized as disloyal.
See Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399, 417, 422 (1958).
204 The New York experience shows, however, that they are hardly so expensive
as to be out of the state's reach. See also Horowitz, supra note 93.
265 See Shapiro, supra note 47, at 591 (collecting sources); Kurland, supra note 68,
at 144-45.
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rank at least among the quarter finalists. Certainly this is an opinion
that ignores past precedent, that fails to define carefully the inter-
ests involved in the case, and that fails even to attempt to rebut
the arguments of its opponents. Perhaps these features are a product
of compromise among five Justices who could not agree, for exam-
ple, on just how Garner should be handled and therefore decided
that the best treatment was silence. Yet it seems likely from com-
parison with other opinions that Elfbrandt was less the product of
compromise than the product of Mr. Justice Douglas' general ap-
proach to the writing of opinions. That approach, a reflection of
what has been described as Mr. Justice "Douglas's relentless effort
to simplify our understanding of the world," 266 is rather nicely ana-
lyzed by Yosal Rogat as follows:
267
As presented by Justice Douglas, not a single case is hard
enough to perplex a right thinking man; a case does not present
a tangle of competing principles, but a single transcendent
principle-for instance, free speech or religious freedom-
which need only be identified for the solution to be plain. In
this way, he avoids the task, so basic to legal analysis, of recon-
ciling competing principles. Instead, he substitutes simple labels
and lines....
Obviously opinions of this type will hardly qualify Mr. Justice
Douglas for membership in Holmes's Society of Jobbists, 268 a posi-
tion to which Mr. Justice Douglas undoubtedly does not aspire.26 9
Still, opinions like Elfbrandt seemingly also would leave a good
deal to be desired for those who, like Mr. Justice Douglas, are in-
terested in "results," not craftsmanship. Opinions that fail to resolve
the competing issues, that ignore precedent and speak in generali-
ties, are also opinions that are easy to distinguish. They provide
stepping stones for moving backward or sideward as well as for-
ward. Such opinions constitute "the law" for only so long as their
author has the ready votes. To some degree this is always true,
but Mr. Justice Douglas to the contrary notwithstanding, the weight
of precedent does have a significant effect even in the area of
constitutional law. To have such effect, however, an opinion should
at least explore fully the issues before the Court and clearly and
carefully resolve them.
266 Rogat, supra note 68, at p. 5, col. 1.
2 67 Id. at p. 6, col. 2. 268 Kurland, supra note 68, at 144-45.
269 Cf. Brennan, Charles Faby, 54 GEo. L. J. 1, 2 (1965).
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